Standing united or falling divided? High stakes bargaining in a TV game show

van Dolder, Dennie; van den Assem, Martijn J.; Camerer, Colin F.; Thaler, Richard H.

Abstract

We examine high stakes three-person bargaining in a game show where contestants bargain over a large money amount that is split into three unequal shares. We find that individual behavior and outcomes are strongly influenced by equity concerns: those who contributed more to the jackpot claim larger shares, are less likely to make concessions, and take home larger amounts. Contestants who announce that they will not back down do well relative to others, but they do not secure larger absolute amounts and they harm others. There is no evidence of a first-mover advantage and little evidence that demographic characteristics matter.

Citation

van Dolder, D., van den Assem, M. J., Camerer, C. F., & Thaler, R. H. (2015). Standing united or falling divided? High stakes bargaining in a TV game show. American Economic Review, 105(5), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2344422

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: May 1, 2015
• Deposit Date: Nov 17, 2015
• Publicly Available Date: Nov 17, 2015
• Journal: American Economic Review
• Print ISSN: 0002-8282
• Electronic ISSN: 1944-7981
• Publisher: American Economic Association
• Peer Reviewed: Not Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 105
• Issue: 5
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2344422
• Keywords: bargaining, negotiation, game show, natural experiment, equity theory, moral property rights, entitlements, fairness, concessions, first-mover advantage
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/984044
• Publisher URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2344422