DEBASMITA BASAK DEBASMITA.BASAK@NOTTINGHAM.AC.UK
Assistant Professor
Social efficiency of entry in a vertically related industry
Basak, Debasmita; Mukherjee, Arijit
Authors
ARIJIT MUKHERJEE Arijit.Mukherjee@nottingham.ac.uk
Professor of Industrial Economics
Abstract
We provide a new perspective to the literature on social desirability of entry by showing that, if the input supplier has market power, social desirability of entry of the final goods producers depends on returns to scale. Entry in the final goods market can be socially insufficient under constant returns to scale technology, but it can be socially excessive under decreasing returns to scale technologies if the cost of entry is low so that the final goods market is sufficiently competitive. Hence, the anti-competitive entry regulation policies are more justifiable if the final goods market is characterised by decreasing returns to scale technologies.
Citation
Basak, D., & Mukherjee, A. (2016). Social efficiency of entry in a vertically related industry. Economics Letters, 139, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.003
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Dec 11, 2015 |
Online Publication Date | Dec 18, 2015 |
Publication Date | Feb 1, 2016 |
Deposit Date | Feb 10, 2016 |
Publicly Available Date | Feb 10, 2016 |
Journal | Economics Letters |
Print ISSN | 0165-1765 |
Electronic ISSN | 1873-7374 |
Publisher | Elsevier |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 139 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.003 |
Keywords | Excess entry; Insufficient entry; Decreasing returns to scale |
Public URL | https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/978222 |
Publisher URL | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176515005121 |
Contract Date | Feb 10, 2016 |
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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
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