Complicity without connection or communication

Barr, Abigail; Michailidou, Georgia

Abstract

We use a novel laboratory experiment involving a die rolling task embedded within a coordination game to investigate whether complicity can emerge when decision-making is simultaneous, the potential accomplices are strangers and neither communication nor signaling is possible. Then, by comparing the behavior observed in this original game to that in a variant in which die-roll reporting players are paired with passive players instead of other die-roll reporters, while everything else is held constant, we isolate the effect of having a potential accomplice on the likelihood of an individual acting immorally. We find that complicity can emerge between strangers in the absence of opportunities to communicate or signal and that having a potential accomplice increases the likelihood of an individual acting immorally.

Citation

Barr, A., & Michailidou, G. (2017). Complicity without connection or communication. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 142, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.013

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jul 12, 2017
• Online Publication Date: Jul 19, 2017
• Publication Date: Oct 1, 2017
• Deposit Date: Sep 14, 2017
• Publicly Available Date: Jan 20, 2019
• Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
• Electronic ISSN: 0167-2681
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 142
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.013
• Keywords: Complicity; Lying; Die under the cup task
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/965922
• Publisher URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268117301919
• Contract Date: Sep 14, 2017