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Export cartel and consumer welfare

Mukherjee, Arijit; Sinha, Uday Bhanu

Authors

Uday Bhanu Sinha



Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show that export cartels are not necessarily harmful for consumers in the importing countries. Using the strategic trade policy model of Brander and Spencer (1985a), we show that, contrary to the harmful effect, product-market cooperation benefits consumers by affecting the trade policies. We further show that consumers in the importing countries are affected adversely if cooperation is among the governments of the exporting countries, instead of the exporting firms.

Citation

Mukherjee, A., & Sinha, U. B. (2019). Export cartel and consumer welfare. Review of International Economics, 27(1), 91-105. doi:10.1111/roie.12362

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jun 10, 2018
Online Publication Date Sep 30, 2018
Publication Date Feb 1, 2019
Deposit Date Jun 18, 2018
Publicly Available Date Oct 1, 2020
Journal Review of International Economics
Print ISSN 0965-7576
Electronic ISSN 1467-9396
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 27
Issue 1
Pages 91-105
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12362
Keywords Consumer surplus; Cooperation; Export cartel; Strategic trade policy
Public URL http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/52462
Publisher URL https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/roie.12362?af=R
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingh.../end_user_agreement.pdf
Additional Information his is the peer reviewed version of the following article, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12362. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf





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