Export cartel and consumer welfare

Mukherjee, Arijit; Sinha, Uday Bhanu

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show that export cartels are not necessarily harmful for consumers in the importing countries. Using the strategic trade policy model of Brander and Spencer (1985a), we show that, contrary to the harmful effect, product-market cooperation benefits consumers by affecting the trade policies. We further show that consumers in the importing countries are affected adversely if cooperation is among the governments of the exporting countries, instead of the exporting firms.

Citation

Mukherjee, A., & Sinha, U. B. (2019). Export cartel and consumer welfare. Review of International Economics, 27(1), 91-105. https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12362

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jun 10, 2018
• Online Publication Date: Sep 30, 2018
• Publication Date: Feb 1, 2019
• Deposit Date: Jun 18, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Oct 1, 2020
• Journal: Review of International Economics
• Print ISSN: 0965-7576
• Electronic ISSN: 1467-9396
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 27
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 91-105
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12362
• Keywords: Consumer surplus; Cooperation; Export cartel; Strategic trade policy
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/937470
• Publisher URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/roie.12362?af=R
• Additional Information: his is the peer reviewed version of the following article, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12362. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
• Contract Date: Jun 18, 2018