Cooperation in polygynous households

Barr, Abigail; Dekker, Marleen; Janssens, Wendy; Kebede, Bereket; Kramer, Berber

Abstract

Using a carefully designed series of public goods games, we compare, across monogamous and polygynous households, the willingness of husbands and wives to cooperate to maximize household gains. Compared to monogamous husbands and wives, polygynous husbands and wives are less cooperative, one with another, and co-wives are least cooperative, one with another. The husbands’ and wives’ behavior in a corresponding series of inter-household games indicates that these differences cannot be attributed to selection of less cooperative people into polygyny. Finally, behavior in polygynous households is more reciprocal and less apparently altruistic.

Citation

Barr, A., Dekker, M., Janssens, W., Kebede, B., & Kramer, B. (2019). Cooperation in polygynous households. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 11(2), 266-283. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20170438

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 2, 2018
• Online Publication Date: Apr 1, 2019
• Publication Date: Apr 1, 2019
• Deposit Date: Jun 13, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Apr 1, 2019
• Journal: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
• Print ISSN: 1945-7782
• Electronic ISSN: 1945-7790
• Publisher: American Economic Association
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 11
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 266-283
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20170438
• Keywords: household resource allocation; cooperative decision-making; polygyny; Nigeria
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/930296
• Publisher URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20170438
• Related Public URLs: https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/app
• Contract Date: Jun 11, 2018