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The golden hello and political transitions

Aidt, Toke S.; Albornoz, Facundo; Gassebner, Martin

Authors

Toke S. Aidt

Martin Gassebner



Abstract

We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson’s [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find that the anticipation of receiving new loan programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.

Citation

Aidt, T. S., Albornoz, F., & Gassebner, M. (2018). The golden hello and political transitions. Journal of Comparative Economics, 46(1), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2017.03.004

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Mar 23, 2017
Online Publication Date Mar 30, 2017
Publication Date Mar 31, 2018
Deposit Date May 16, 2017
Publicly Available Date Mar 28, 2024
Journal Journal of Comparative Economics
Print ISSN 0147-5967
Electronic ISSN 0147-5967
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 46
Issue 1
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2017.03.004
Keywords Political transitions; Democracy; Autocracy; IMF; World bank
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/923060
Publisher URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596717300276

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