The golden hello and political transitions

Aidt, Toke S.; Albornoz, Facundo; Gassebner, Martin

Abstract

We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson’s [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find that the anticipation of receiving new loan programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.

Citation

Aidt, T. S., Albornoz, F., & Gassebner, M. (2018). The golden hello and political transitions. Journal of Comparative Economics, 46(1), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2017.03.004

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Mar 23, 2017
• Online Publication Date: Mar 30, 2017
• Publication Date: Mar 31, 2018
• Deposit Date: May 16, 2017
• Publicly Available Date: Mar 31, 2019
• Journal: Journal of Comparative Economics
• Print ISSN: 0147-5967
• Electronic ISSN: 1095-7227
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 46
• Issue: 1
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2017.03.004
• Keywords: Political transitions; Democracy; Autocracy; IMF; World bank
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/923060
• Publisher URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596717300276
• Contract Date: May 16, 2017