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Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)

Bouwmeester, Samantha; Verkoeijen, Peter P.J.L.; Aczel, Balazs; Barbosa, Fernando; B?gue, Laurent; Bra?as-Garza, Pablo; Chmura, Thorsten; Cornelissen, Gert; D?ssing, Felix S.; Esp?n, Antonio M.; Evans, Anthony M.; Ferreira-Santos, Fernando; Fiedler, Susann; Flegr, Jaroslav; Ghaffari, Minou; Gl?ckner, Andreas; Goeschl, Timo; Guo, Lisa; Hauser, Oliver P.; Hernan-Gonzalez, Roberto; Herrero, Anthony; Horne, Zachary; Houdek, Petr; Johannesson, Magnus; Koppel, Lina; Kujal, Praveen; Laine, Tei; Lohse, Johannes; Martins, Eva C.; Mauro, Carlos; Mischkowski, Dorothee; Mukherjee, Sumitava; Myrseth, Kristian Ove; Navarro-Martinez, Daniel; Neal, Tess M.S.; Novakova, Julie; Pag?, Roger; Paiva, Tiago O.; Palfi, Bence; Piovesan, Marco; Rahal, Rima-Maria; Salomon, Erika; Srinivasan, Narayanan; Srivastava, Ajita; Szaszi, Barnabas; Szollosi, Aba; Thor, Karoline ?.; Tingh?g, Gustav; Trueblood, Jennifer S.; Van Bavel, J. Jay; van ?t Veer, Anna E.; V?stfj?ll, Daniel; Warner, Megan; Wengstr?m, Erik; Wills, J...

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Authors

Samantha Bouwmeester

Peter P.J.L. Verkoeijen

Balazs Aczel

Fernando Barbosa

Laurent B�gue

Pablo Bra�as-Garza

Thorsten Chmura

Gert Cornelissen

Felix S. D�ssing

Antonio M. Esp�n

Anthony M. Evans

Fernando Ferreira-Santos

Susann Fiedler

Jaroslav Flegr

Minou Ghaffari

Andreas Gl�ckner

Timo Goeschl

Lisa Guo

Oliver P. Hauser

Roberto Hernan-Gonzalez

Anthony Herrero

Zachary Horne

Petr Houdek

Magnus Johannesson

Lina Koppel

Praveen Kujal

Tei Laine

Johannes Lohse

Eva C. Martins

Carlos Mauro

Dorothee Mischkowski

Sumitava Mukherjee

Kristian Ove Myrseth

Daniel Navarro-Martinez

Tess M.S. Neal

Julie Novakova

Roger Pag�

Tiago O. Paiva

Bence Palfi

Marco Piovesan

Rima-Maria Rahal

Erika Salomon

Narayanan Srinivasan

Ajita Srivastava

Barnabas Szaszi

Aba Szollosi

Karoline �. Thor

Gustav Tingh�g

Jennifer S. Trueblood

J. Jay Van Bavel

Anna E. van �t Veer

Daniel V�stfj�ll

Megan Warner

Erik Wengstr�m

Julian Wills

Conny E. Wollbrant



Abstract

In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jul 6, 2015
Online Publication Date Mar 1, 2017
Publication Date May 1, 2017
Deposit Date Mar 28, 2017
Publicly Available Date Mar 28, 2017
Journal Perspectives on Psychological Science
Print ISSN 1745-6916
Electronic ISSN 1745-6924
Publisher Association for Psychological Science
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 12
Issue 3
Pages 527-542
DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617693624
Keywords Cooperation, Social heuristic hypothesis, Decision making, Economic games, Social psychology, Replication
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/842505
Publisher URL http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1745691617693624

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