Propositions as truthmaker conditions

Jago, Mark

Abstract

Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness.

Citation

Jago, M. (2017). Propositions as truthmaker conditions. Argumenta, 4(2), 293-308. https://doi.org/10.23811/47.arg2017.jag

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Nov 15, 2016
• Publication Date: May 30, 2017
• Deposit Date: Dec 6, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: May 30, 2017
• Journal: Argumenta
• Electronic ISSN: 2465-2334
• Publisher: Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 4
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 293-308
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.23811/47.arg2017.jag
• Keywords: Propositions; Truthmakers; Hyperintensionality; Content; Meaning
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/828496
• Publisher URL: https://www.argumenta.org/article/propositions-truthmaker-conditions/
• Additional Information: Special issue on Thinking the (Im)possible.