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Individual choices in dynamic networks: an experiment on social preferences

van Dolder, Dennie; Buskens, Vincent

Authors

Dennie van Dolder dennie.vandolder@nottingham.ac.uk

Vincent Buskens v.buskens@uu.nl



Abstract

Game-theoretic models of network formation typically assume that people create relations so as to maximize their own outcome in the network. Recent experiments on network formation suggest that the assumption of self-interest might be unwarranted and that social preferences, such as altruism and inequality aversion, play a role in the formation of social networks. We developed an experiment to systematically investigate whether people show preferences for outcomes of others during network formation. We find that such preferences play a role when network decisions degenerate to simple two-person decision tasks. In more complex environments, however, we find little evidence for social preferences as a significant decision criterion. Furthermore, we find some evidence for farsighted behavior in network formation.

Citation

van Dolder, D., & Buskens, V. (2014). Individual choices in dynamic networks: an experiment on social preferences. PLoS ONE, 9(4), doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092276

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Apr 14, 2014
Deposit Date Nov 17, 2015
Publicly Available Date Nov 17, 2015
Journal PLoS ONE
Electronic ISSN 1932-6203
Publisher Public Library of Science
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 9
Issue 4
Article Number e92276
DOI https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0092276
Public URL http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/id/eprint/30842
Publisher URL http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0092276
Copyright Statement Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0

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Copyright Statement
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0





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