Rules versus norms: How formal and informal institutions shape judicial sentencing cycles

Dippel, Christian; Poyker, Michael

Abstract

Existing research on electoral sentencing cycles consistently finds that elected judges levy longer sentences when they are up for re-election. However, this research finding had previously drawn exclusively on data from four states. Using newly collected sentencing data on seven additional states, we find substantial, and previously un-noted, heterogeneity in the strength of sentencing cycles. This heterogeneity appears to be explained by cross-state differences in informal norm of whether incumbent judges get challenged in judicial elections. We show that variation is explain by the baseline probability of having a challenger and the number of donations per electoral race. That variation, in turn, is not well explained by observable formal electoral institutions.

Citation

Dippel, C., & Poyker, M. (2021). Rules versus norms: How formal and informal institutions shape judicial sentencing cycles. Journal of Comparative Economics, 49(3), 645-659. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2021.02.003

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Feb 15, 2021
• Online Publication Date: Mar 8, 2021
• Publication Date: 2021-09
• Deposit Date: Jun 29, 2021
• Publicly Available Date: Mar 9, 2023
• Journal: Journal of Comparative Economics
• Print ISSN: 0147-5967
• Electronic ISSN: 1095-7227
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 49
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 645-659
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2021.02.003
• Keywords: Economics and Econometrics
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/5746455
• Publisher URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596721000159