From Essence to Metaphysical Modality?

Noonan, Harold W.

Abstract

How can we acquire knowledge of metaphysical modality? How can someone come to know that he could have been elsewhere right now, or an accountant rather than a philosophy teacher, but could not have been a turnip? Jago proposes an account of a route to knowledge of the way things could have been and must be. He argues that we can move to knowledge of metaphysical modality from knowledge about essence. Curtis rejects Jago’s explanation. It cannot, he argues, explain our knowledge of de re necessity. We agree. But there is more to be said. To give an account of our knowledge of metaphysical necessity is part of the task Jago set himself. But another part is to give an account of the knowledge of the (non-actual) possibilities accorded to particular objects. And prior to both what is needed, and something Jago attempts to supply, is an account of how ordinary knowers can come to have knowledge of an individual’s essential properties. We argue that Jago’s accounts of both these additional matters are also unsatisfactory. This is important because the thought that our knowledge of metaphysical modality has its source in our knowledge of essence is currently an attractive one and Jago has set out very clearly what must be done to justify the thought. The flaws in his proposal thus indicate the work needed if the attractive thought is to be accepted.

Citation

Noonan, H. W. (2022). From Essence to Metaphysical Modality?. Axiomathes, 32(2), 345-354. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09527-2

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Nov 4, 2020
• Online Publication Date: Nov 22, 2020
• Publication Date: 2022-04
• Deposit Date: Nov 2, 2020
• Publicly Available Date: Nov 23, 2021
• Journal: Axiomathes
• Print ISSN: 1122-1151
• Electronic ISSN: 1572-8390
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 32
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 345-354
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09527-2
• Keywords: Philosophy; Mathematics (miscellaneous)
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/5013175
• Publisher URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10516-020-09527-2