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Spinoza’s Analysis of his Imagined Readers’ Axiology

Rumbold, Benedict

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Abstract

Before presenting his own account of value in the Ethics, Spinoza spends much of EIAppendix and EIVPreface attempting to refute a series of axiological ‘prejudices’ that he takes to have taken root in the minds of his readership. In doing so, Spinoza adopts what might be termed a ‘genealogical’ argumentative strategy. That is, he tries to establish the falsity of imagined readership’s prejudices about good and bad, perfection and imperfection, by first showing that the ideas from which they have arisen are themselves false. Many elements of this genealogy, however, remain unclear. First, both the nature of the metaethical prejudices Spinoza believes we have been labouring under, and the metaphysical prejudices that he takes to have given rise to them, continue to attract widespread disagreement. Although much less commented on, it is also not entirely obvious why Spinoza takes the one to have engendered the other. In this article, I attempt to clarify Spinoza’s reasoning in both of these respects, ultimately concluding that Spinoza offers us two accounts of how this process has occurred, the first beginning from an anthropocentric doctrine of divine providence, the second from more secular, perhaps more purely Aristotelian metaphysical tradition.

Citation

Rumbold, B. (2021). Spinoza’s Analysis of his Imagined Readers’ Axiology. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 103(2), 281-312. https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2017-0099

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Nov 19, 2018
Online Publication Date Oct 15, 2020
Publication Date May 29, 2021
Deposit Date Oct 23, 2020
Publicly Available Date Oct 16, 2021
Journal Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
Print ISSN 0003-9101
Electronic ISSN 0003-9101
Publisher De Gruyter
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 103
Issue 2
Pages 281-312
DOI https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2017-0099
Keywords Philosophy
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/4986557
Publisher URL https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/agph-2017-0099/html

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