Scepticism About Neo-Aristotelian Essences

Curtis, Benjamin; Noonan, Harold

Abstract

Many philosophers today accept the broadly Aristotelian view that one can explain de re necessary properties by invoking essence. These ‘Neo-Aristotelian essentialists’ hold that a property F is an essential property of x iff specifying F gives a correct answer to the Aristotelian ‘what is x?’ question. We are sceptical. According to neo-Aristotelian essentialists, essential properties are not themselves de re modal properties, but they are supposed to explain why things have their de re modal properties. Neo-Aristotelian essentialists accept the following principle (ENL): If x is essentially F, then x is necessarily F. We ask: Why? We first clarify the neo-Aristotelian notion of essence via the Aristotelian “what is x?” question. So far as we can see, the only way to do this is by appeal to the notion of a substance sortal. We then consider the notion of a substance sortal itself, and argue that there is nothing in that notion that even so much as suggests that ENL is true.

Citation

Curtis, B., & Noonan, H. (2024). Scepticism About Neo-Aristotelian Essences. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 80(4), 885-904. https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_0885

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Nov 12, 2024
• Online Publication Date: Dec 6, 2024
• Publication Date: 2024-11
• Deposit Date: Nov 19, 2024
• Publicly Available Date: Nov 30, 2024
• Journal: Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
• Print ISSN: 0870-5283
• Electronic ISSN: 2183-461X
• Publisher: Aletheia - Associação Científica e Cultural
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 80
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 885-904
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.17990/RPF/2024_80_4_0885
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/42207149
• Publisher URL: https://www.publicacoesfacfil.pt/category.php?id_category=8900&id_lang=1