Disability, Options and Well-Being

Crawley, Thomas

Abstract

Copyright © 2020 Cambridge University Press. Many endorse the Bad-Difference View (BDV) of disability which says that disability makes one likely to be worse off even in the absence of discrimination against the disabled. Others defend the Mere-Difference View (MDV) of disability which says that, discounting discrimination, disability does not make one likely to be worse (or better) off. A common motivation for the BDV is the Options Argument which identifies reduction in valuable options as a harm of disability. Some reject this argument, arguing that disabled people's prospects aren't hindered by having fewer options. In this article, I defend the Options Argument by arguing that, in disability cases, possessing a greater number of valuable options seems to overall improve well-being prospects. As such, the Options Argument appears to be sound and - although it doesn't establish the BDV - it lends plausibility to the BDV by identifying a potentially significant cost of disability.

Citation

Crawley, T. (2020). Disability, Options and Well-Being. Utilitas, 32(3), 316-334. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820819000463

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Sep 28, 2019
• Online Publication Date: Jan 31, 2020
• Publication Date: 2020-09
• Deposit Date: Oct 3, 2019
• Publicly Available Date: Jan 31, 2020
• Journal: Utilitas
• Print ISSN: 0953-8208
• Electronic ISSN: 1741-6183
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 32
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 316-334
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820819000463
• Keywords: Philosophy; Sociology and Political Science
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/2743179
• Publisher URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/utilitas/article/disability-options-and-wellbeing/C204133AEEA0C33D232DFCFF18F1BF1E
• Contract Date: Oct 3, 2019