The economic origins of government

Allen, Robert C.; Bertazzini, Mattia C.; Heldring, Leander

Abstract

We test between cooperative and extractive theories of the origins of government. We use river shifts in southern Iraq as a natural experiment, in a new archeological panel dataset. A shift away creates a local demand for a government to coordinate because private river irrigation needs to be replaced with public canals. It disincentivizes local extraction as land is no longer productive without irrigation. Consistent with a cooperative theory of government, a river shift away leads to state formation, canal construction, and the payment of tribute. We argue that the first governments coordinated between extended households which implemented public good provision.

Citation

Allen, R. C., Bertazzini, M. C., & Heldring, L. (2023). The economic origins of government. American Economic Review, 113(10), 2507-2545

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jul 17, 2023
• Publication Date: 2023-10
• Deposit Date: Sep 18, 2023
• Publicly Available Date: Oct 31, 2023
• Journal: American Economic Review
• Print ISSN: 0002-8282
• Electronic ISSN: 1944-7981
• Publisher: American Economic Association
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 113
• Issue: 10
• Pages: 2507-2545
• Keywords: Coordination, Extraction, Government, Iraq
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/25361254
• Publisher URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20201919