Double‐donor surrogacy and the intention to parent

Baron, Teresa

Abstract

Assisted reproduction often involves biological contributions by third parties such as egg/sperm donors, mitochondrial DNA donors, and surrogate mothers. However, these arrangements are also characterised by a biological relationship between the child and at least one intending parent. For example, one or both intending parents might use their own eggs/sperm in surrogacy, or an intending mother might conceive using donor sperm or gestate a donor embryo. What happens when this relationship is absent, as in the case of 'double‐donor surrogacy' arrangements (DDS)? Here, a child is conceived using both donor eggs and sperm, carried by a surrogate, and raised by the commissioning parents. In this paper, I critically examine proposals to allow DDS in the United Kingdom, and the intentionalist justification for treating this practice distinctly (morally and legally speaking) from private adoption. I argue that the intentionalist approach cannot plausibly justify such a distinction and that other approaches to moral parenthood are also unlikely to succeed.

Citation

Baron, T. (2024). Double‐donor surrogacy and the intention to parent. Bioethics, 38(7), 609-615. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13204

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jun 23, 2023
• Online Publication Date: Jul 19, 2023
• Publication Date: 2024-09
• Deposit Date: Sep 11, 2023
• Publicly Available Date: Sep 11, 2023
• Journal: Bioethics
• Print ISSN: 0269-9702
• Electronic ISSN: 1467-8519
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 38
• Issue: 7
• Pages: 609-615
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13204
• Keywords: surrogacy, parents, family, assisted reproduction, intention
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/23472367
• Publisher URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/bioe.13204