Skip to main content

Research Repository

Advanced Search

A theory of esteem based peer pressure

Adriani, Fabrizio; Sonderegger, Silvia

A theory of esteem based peer pressure Thumbnail


Authors

Fabrizio Adriani



Contributors

Fabrizio Adriani
Other

Abstract

How does the incentive to engage in social signaling depend on the composition of peers? We find that an increase in the mean peer quality may either strengthen signaling incentives (keeping up with the Joneses) or weaken them (small fish in a big pond). Both right and left truncations of the distribution of peer quality reduce signaling incentives, while more dispersed peer distributions strengthen them. Finally, more right skewed peer distributions strengthen signaling incentives when only a small fraction of the group engage in signaling, but weaken them when signaling is widespread. JEL Codes: D82

Citation

Adriani, F., & Sonderegger, S. (2019). A theory of esteem based peer pressure. Games and Economic Behavior, 115, 314-335. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.010

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Apr 30, 2019
Online Publication Date Mar 26, 2019
Publication Date 2019-05
Deposit Date Jul 18, 2019
Publicly Available Date Sep 27, 2020
Journal Games and Economic Behavior
Print ISSN 0899-8256
Electronic ISSN 1090-2473
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 115
Pages 314-335
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.010
Keywords Esteem; Status; Peer pressure; Signaling; Small fish in a big pond; Conspicuous consumption; Distributional comparative statics
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/2320095
Publisher URL https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825619300454
Additional Information This article is maintained by: Elsevier; Article Title: A theory of esteem based peer pressure; Journal Title: Games and Economic Behavior; CrossRef DOI link to publisher maintained version: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.010; Content Type: article; Copyright: © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Contract Date Jul 18, 2019

Files





You might also like



Downloadable Citations