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Optimal Sequential Contests

Hinnosaar, Toomas

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Abstract

I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R\&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players' efforts increases the total effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized with no transparency. I also show that in addition to the first-mover advantage, there is an earlier-mover advantage. Finally, I derive the limits for large contests and discuss the limit to perfectly competitive outcomes under different disclosure rules.

Citation

Hinnosaar, T. (in press). Optimal Sequential Contests. Theoretical Economics, 19(1), 207-244. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3119014

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Mar 22, 2023
Deposit Date Mar 28, 2023
Journal Theoretical Economics
Print ISSN 1933-6837
Electronic ISSN 1555-7561
Publisher Econometric Society
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 19
Issue 1
Pages 207-244
DOI https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3119014
Keywords contest design; oligopoly; public goods; rent-seeking; R&D
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/18811895
Publisher URL https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/view/20240207
Related Public URLs https://econtheory.org/

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