LYDIA FARINA LYDIA.FARINA@NOTTINGHAM.AC.UK
Assistant Professor in Philosophy
Artificial Intelligence Systems, Responsibility and Agential Self-Awareness
Farina, Lydia
Authors
Contributors
Vincent C Müller
Editor
Abstract
This paper investigates the claim that artificial Intelligence Systems cannot be held morally responsible because they do not have an ability for agential self-awareness e.g. they cannot be aware that they are the agents of an action. The main suggestion is that if agential self-awareness and related first person representations presuppose an awareness of a self, the possibility of responsible artificial intelligence systems cannot be evaluated independently of research conducted on the nature of the self. Focusing on a specific account of the self from the phenomenological tradition, this paper suggests that a minimal necessary condition that artificial intelligence systems must satisfy so that they have a capability for self-awareness, is having a minimal self defined as ‘a sense of ownership’. As this sense of ownership is usually associated with having a living body, one suggestion is that artificial intelligence systems must have similar living bodies so they can have a sense of self. Discussing cases of robotic animals as examples of the possibility of artificial intelligence systems having a sense of self, the paper concludes that the possibility of artificial intelligence systems having a ‘sense of ownership’ or a sense of self may be a necessary condition for having responsibility.
Citation
Farina, L. (2022). Artificial Intelligence Systems, Responsibility and Agential Self-Awareness. In V. C. Müller (Ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2021 (15-25). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09153-7_2
Presentation Conference Type | Conference Paper (Published) |
---|---|
Conference Name | PT-AI 2021 |
Start Date | Sep 27, 2021 |
End Date | Sep 28, 2021 |
Acceptance Date | Aug 15, 2022 |
Online Publication Date | Nov 15, 2022 |
Publication Date | 2022 |
Deposit Date | Oct 25, 2023 |
Publisher | Springer Nature |
Pages | 15-25 |
Series Title | Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics |
Series Number | 63 |
Series ISSN | 2192-6255 |
Book Title | Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2021 |
ISBN | 9783031091520 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09153-7_2 |
Public URL | https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/14033469 |
Publisher URL | https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-09153-7_2 |
Additional Information | First Online: 15 November 2022; Conference Acronym: PTAI; Conference Name: Conference on Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence; Conference City: Gothenburg; Conference Country: Sweden; Conference Year: 2021; Conference Start Date: 27 September 2021; Conference End Date: 28 September 2021; Conference Number: 4; Conference ID: ptai2021; Conference URL: https://www.pt-ai.org/2021 |
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