Licensing under convex costs

Mukherjee, Arijit

Abstract

We show that both the outside and inside innovators license a new product (or drastic process innovation) to all potential licensees in the presence of convex costs, which occur under decreasing returns to scale technologies. An implication of our analysis is that a monopolist producer may prefer technology licensing in a homogeneous goods industry. We also show that an inside innovator's incentive for innovation may be higher than that of an outside innovator. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Wien.

Citation

Mukherjee, A. (2013). Licensing under convex costs. Journal of Economics, 111(3), 289-299. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-013-0333-9

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jan 9, 2013
• Online Publication Date: Feb 27, 2013
• Publication Date: Feb 27, 2013
• Deposit Date: Dec 10, 2018
• Journal: Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
• Print ISSN: 0976-5239
• Electronic ISSN: 1617-7134
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 111
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 289-299
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-013-0333-9
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1394472
• Publisher URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00712-013-0333-9