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Licensing under convex costs

Mukherjee, Arijit


Professor of Industrial Economics


We show that both the outside and inside innovators license a new product (or drastic process innovation) to all potential licensees in the presence of convex costs, which occur under decreasing returns to scale technologies. An implication of our analysis is that a monopolist producer may prefer technology licensing in a homogeneous goods industry. We also show that an inside innovator's incentive for innovation may be higher than that of an outside innovator. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Wien.


Mukherjee, A. (2013). Licensing under convex costs. Journal of Economics, 111(3), 289-299.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jan 9, 2013
Online Publication Date Feb 27, 2013
Publication Date Feb 27, 2013
Deposit Date Dec 10, 2018
Journal Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
Print ISSN 0976-5239
Electronic ISSN 1617-7134
Publisher Springer
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 111
Issue 3
Pages 289-299
Public URL
Publisher URL