Swapnendu Banerjee
Optimal patent licensing—Two or three‐part tariff
Banerjee, Swapnendu; Mukherjee, Arijit; Poddar, Sougata
Authors
Abstract
We look into technology transfer by an insider patentee in a spatial duopoly model under three types of licensing contracts—(i) two-part tariff with fixed fee and per-unit royalty, (ii) two-part tariff with fixed fee and ad-valorem royalty and (iii) general three-part tariff with fixed fee, per-unit and ad-valorem royalties. Under two-part tariff contracts, the licenser is better off with the per-unit royalty contract but the general contract does better than the other contracts. In contrast to the existing literature, all three licensing contracts may make the consumers worse-off compared to no licensing, with the lowest consumer surplus achieved under the general licensing contract. Welfare under the general licensing contract is equal to the welfare under two-part tariff with ad-valorem royalty and it is higher than the welfare under no licensing but lower than the welfare under two-part tariff with per-unit royalty. Hence, the general three-part licensing contract is privately optimal but not socially optimal. Similar conclusions hold also under a nonspatial linear demand model with differentiated products.
Citation
Banerjee, S., Mukherjee, A., & Poddar, S. (2022). Optimal patent licensing—Two or three‐part tariff. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 25(3), 624-648. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12630
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Oct 25, 2022 |
Online Publication Date | Dec 13, 2022 |
Publication Date | 2022-06 |
Deposit Date | Oct 28, 2022 |
Publicly Available Date | Dec 1, 2022 |
Journal | Journal of Public Economic Theory |
Print ISSN | 1097-3923 |
Electronic ISSN | 1467-9779 |
Publisher | Wiley |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 25 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 624-648 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12630 |
Keywords | Economics and Econometrics; Sociology and Political Science; Finance |
Public URL | https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/12900321 |
Publisher URL | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jpet.12630 |
Files
18336
(1.4 Mb)
PDF
Publisher Licence URL
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
You might also like
Horizontal merger under strategic tax policy
(2015)
Journal Article
Privatization in the presence of foreign competition and strategic policies
(2014)
Journal Article
Competition, foreign direct investment and welfare
(2015)
Journal Article
Union bargaining power, subcontracting and innovation
(2017)
Journal Article
Domestic patenting systems and foreign licensing choices
(2017)
Journal Article
Downloadable Citations
About Repository@Nottingham
Administrator e-mail: discovery-access-systems@nottingham.ac.uk
This application uses the following open-source libraries:
SheetJS Community Edition
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
PDF.js
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
Font Awesome
SIL OFL 1.1 (http://scripts.sil.org/OFL)
MIT License (http://opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.html)
CC BY 3.0 ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
Powered by Worktribe © 2024
Advanced Search