Outputs (287)

Truthmaker Accounts of Propositions (2022)
Book Chapter
Jago, M. (2022). Truthmaker Accounts of Propositions. In C. Tillman, & A. R. Murray (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge

Concepts May Still Be Objects (2022)
Journal Article
Noonan, H. (2022). Concepts May Still Be Objects. Organon F, 29(3), 376-388. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29304

Speculative Aesthetic Expressivism (2022)
Journal Article
Robson, J., & Sinclair, N. (2023). Speculative Aesthetic Expressivism. British Journal of Aesthetics, 63(2), 181-197. https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayac036

In this paper we sketch a new version of aesthetic expressivism. We argue that one advantage of this view is that it explains various putative norms on the formation and revision of aesthetic judgement. We begin by setting out our proposed explananda... Read More about Speculative Aesthetic Expressivism.

The Evolutionary Debunking Of Quasi-realism (2022)
Book Chapter
Sinclair, N., & Chamberlain, J. (2023). The Evolutionary Debunking Of Quasi-realism. In D. E. Machuca (Ed.), Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Epistemology (33-55). London: Taylor & Francis (Routledge)

In “The Evolutionary Debunking of Quasi-Realism,” Neil Sinclair and James Chamberlain present a novel answer that quasi-realists can pro-vide to a version of the reliability challenge in ethics—which asks for an explanation of why our moral... Read More about The Evolutionary Debunking Of Quasi-realism.

Trusting What Ought to Happen (2022)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2024). Trusting What Ought to Happen. Erkenntnis, 89(5), 1887-1902. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00608-9

This paper introduces a new account of trust and distrust. The core aim of the paper is to introduce an account of trust that places treats trust and what ‘ought’ to happen as close conceptual companions. Over the course of the paper, I develop the a... Read More about Trusting What Ought to Happen.

The First Person and ‘The First Person’ (2022)
Book Chapter
Noonan, H. (2022). The First Person and ‘The First Person’. In R. Teichmann (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of Elizabeth Anscombe (397-412). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190887353.013.25

In ‘The First Person’ Anscombe argues that ‘I’ is not a referring expression: ‘I’ is neither a name nor another kind of expression whose logical role is to make a reference, at all. Her no-reference thesis has met with general incredulity. This chapt... Read More about The First Person and ‘The First Person’.

Public Reason and the Justification of Punishment (2022)
Journal Article
Hoskins, Z. (2022). Public Reason and the Justification of Punishment. Criminal Justice Ethics, 41(2), 121-141. https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2022.2102838

Chad Flanders has argued that retributivism is inconsistent with John Rawls’s core notion of public reason, which sets out those considerations on which legitimate exercises of state power can be based. Flanders asserts that retributivism is grounded... Read More about Public Reason and the Justification of Punishment.

Reasons for Rule Consequentialists (2022)
Journal Article
Woodard, C. (2022). Reasons for Rule Consequentialists. Ratio, 35(4), 251-260. https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12352

This paper explores what a Rule Consequentialist of Brad Hooker's sort can and should say about normative reasons for action. I claim that they can provide a theory of reasons, but that doing so requires distinguishing different roles of rules in the... Read More about Reasons for Rule Consequentialists.

All Designators are Rigid (2022)
Journal Article
Noonan, H. (2023). All Designators are Rigid. Metaphysica, 24(1), 101-107. https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2021-0040

In Naming and Necessity Kripke introduces the concept of a rigid designator and argues that proper names are rigid designators. He argues that in this way they are different from typical definite descriptions (though he allows that some definite desc... Read More about All Designators are Rigid.

Personal Identity and Morality (2022)
Book Chapter
Noonan, H. (2022). Personal Identity and Morality. In K. Tobia (Ed.), Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the Self (87-97). Bloomsbury Publishing. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350246928.0011

Does the true account of personal identity undermine everyday moral thinking? Do every day moral practices presuppose a false account of our nature and persistence conditions? I shall consider the three main accounts of personal identity in the conte... Read More about Personal Identity and Morality.