Outputs (223)

REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM (2016)
Journal Article
Cunningham, J. (2016). REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM. Episteme, 13(1), 111-132. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.62

It is now common to distinguish Metaphysical from Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge principle will... Read More about REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM.

Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience” (2016)
Journal Article
Jansson, L. (2016). Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 53, 45-53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2015.12.002

Everettian quantum mechanics faces the challenge of how to make sense of probability and probabilistic reasoning in a setting where there is typically no unique outcome of measurements. Wallace has built on a proof by Deutsch to argue that a notion o... Read More about Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”.

Why did Feyerabend Defend Astrology? Integrity, Virtue, and the Authority of Science (2016)
Journal Article

Figurative Speech: Pointing a Poisoned Arrow at the Heart of Semantics (2016)
Journal Article

I argue that figurative speech, and irony in particular, presents a deep challenge to the orthodox view about sentence content. The standard view is that sentence contents are, at their core, propositional contents: truth-conditional contents. Moreov... Read More about Figurative Speech: Pointing a Poisoned Arrow at the Heart of Semantics.

Russell-names: an introduction to Millian descriptivism (2015)
Journal Article
Predelli, S. (2016). Russell-names: an introduction to Millian descriptivism. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 45(5), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9390-6

This essay studies the semantic properties of what I call Russell-names. Russell-names bear intimate semantic relations with descriptive conditions, in consonance with the main tenets of descriptivism. Yet, they are endowed with the semantic properti... Read More about Russell-names: an introduction to Millian descriptivism.

Explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated (2015)
Journal Article
Jansson, L. (2015). Explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated. Journal of Philosophy, 112(11), https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20151121138

The problem of explanatory non-symmetries provides the strongest reason to abandon the view that laws can figure in explanations without causal underpinnings. I argue that this problem can be overcome. The solution that I propose starts from noticing... Read More about Explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated.

Plenitude, pluralism and neo-Lockean persons (2015)
Journal Article
Noonan, H. (2015). Plenitude, pluralism and neo-Lockean persons. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 22(11-12),

The political is political: Conformity and the illusion of dissent in contemporary political philosophy (2015)
Journal Article
Duff, K. (2016). The political is political: Conformity and the illusion of dissent in contemporary political philosophy. Contemporary Political Theory, 15(3), e50-e53. https://doi.org/10.1057/cpt.2015.51

The new a-theory of time (2015)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2015). The new a-theory of time. Inquiry, 58(6), https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2015.1069067

The New A-theory of Time (TNAT) is the view, to be elaborated and defended in this article, that many times exist, and that time is real in virtue of every moment in time bearing each of the so-called A-properties: past, present and future. I argue t... Read More about The new a-theory of time.

Against strong pluralism (2015)
Journal Article
Noonan, H. W. (in press). Against strong pluralism. Philosophia, 43(4), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9640-4

Strong pluralists hold that not even permanent material coincidence is enough for identity. Strong pluralism entails the possibility of purely material objects -- even if not coincident -- alike in all general respects, categorial and dispositional,... Read More about Against strong pluralism.