Outputs (18)

Propositions as truthmaker conditions (2017)
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2017). Propositions as truthmaker conditions. Argumenta, 4(2), 293-308. https://doi.org/10.23811/47.arg2017.jag

Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an a... Read More about Propositions as truthmaker conditions.

Modal realism, still at your convenience (2017)
Journal Article
Noonan, H., & Jago, M. (in press). Modal realism, still at your convenience. Analysis, 77(2), https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx037

Divers (2014) presents a set of de re modal truths which, he claims, are inconvenient for Lewisean modal realism. We argue that there is no inconvenience for Lewis.

Advanced modalizing problems (2016)
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2016). Advanced modalizing problems. Mind, 125(499), 627-642. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv172

I present an internal problem for David Lewis’s genuine modal realism. My aim is to show that his analysis of modality is inconsistent with his metaphysics. I consider several ways of modifying the Lewisian analysis of modality, but argue that none a... Read More about Advanced modalizing problems.

Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar (2016)
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2016). Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar. Analysis, 76(3), 278-283. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw033

Stephen Barker (2014) presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile al... Read More about Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar.

Impossible Worlds (2013)
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2015). Impossible Worlds. Noûs, 49(4), 713-728. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12051

© 2013 The Author(s). NOÛS published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Impossible worlds are representations of impossible things and impossible happenings. They earn their keep in a semantic or metaphysical theory if they do the right theoretical work for... Read More about Impossible Worlds.

Rule-based and Resource-bounded: A New Look at Epistemic Logic
Presentation / Conference Contribution
Jago, M. (2006). Rule-based and Resource-bounded: A New Look at Epistemic Logic.

Syntactic logics do not suffer from the problems of logical omniscience but are often thought to lack interesting properties relating to epistemic notions. By focusing on the case of rule-based agents, I develop a framework for modelling resource-bou... Read More about Rule-based and Resource-bounded: A New Look at Epistemic Logic.

Imagine the possibilities: information without overload
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2006). Imagine the possibilities: information without overload

Information is often modelled as a set of relevant possibilities, treated as logically possible worlds. However, this has the unintuitive consequence that the logical consequences of an agent's information cannot be informative for that agent. There... Read More about Imagine the possibilities: information without overload.

Belief and bounded rationality
Journal Article
Jago, M. (2006). Belief and bounded rationality