Belief pills and the possibility of moral epistemology

Sinclair, Neil

doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823841.001.0001

All Outputs (2)

The Naturalistic Fallacy (2018)
Book
Sinclair, N. (2018). N. Sinclair (Ed.). The Naturalistic Fallacy. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316717578

Belief pills and the possibility of moral epistemology (2018)
Book Chapter
Sinclair, N. (2018). Belief pills and the possibility of moral epistemology. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaethics. Oxford University Press (OUP). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823841.001.0001

I argue that evolutionary debunking arguments are dialectically ineffective against a range of plausible positions regarding moral truth. I first (§1) distinguish debunking arguments which target the truth of moral judgements from those which target... Read More about Belief pills and the possibility of moral epistemology.