Martijn J. van den Assem email@example.com
Split or steal? Cooperative behavior when the stakes are large
van den Assem, Martijn J.; van Dolder, Dennie; Thaler, Richard H.
Dennie van Dolder firstname.lastname@example.org
Richard H. Thaler email@example.com
We examine cooperative behavior when large sums of money are at stake, using data from the TV game show “Golden Balls”. At the end of each episode, contestants play a variant on the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma for large and widely ranging stakes averaging over $20,000. Cooperation is surprisingly high for amounts that would normally be considered consequential but look tiny in their current context, what we call a “big peanuts” phenomenon. Utilizing the prior interaction among contestants, we find evidence that people have reciprocal preferences. Surprisingly, there is little support for conditional cooperation in our sample. That is, players do not seem to be more likely to cooperate if their opponent might be expected to cooperate. Further, we replicate earlier findings that males are less cooperative than females, but this gender effect reverses for older contestants because men become increasingly cooperative as their age increases.
|Journal Article Type||Article|
|Publication Date||Oct 7, 2011|
|Peer Reviewed||Peer Reviewed|
|Institution Citation||van den Assem, M. J., van Dolder, D., & Thaler, R. H. (2011). Split or steal? Cooperative behavior when the stakes are large. Management Science, 58(1), doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1413|
|Keywords||natural experiment, game show, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, cooperative behaviour, social behaviour, social preferences, reciprocity, reciprocal behaviour, context effects, anchoring|
|Copyright Statement||Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingh.../end_user_agreement.pdf|
2012 Split or Steal_ Cooperative Behavior When the Stakes Are Large.pdf
Copyright information regarding this work can be found at the following address: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf