Moral realism, quasi‐realism and moral steadfastness

Chamberlain, James

Abstract

Some moral propositions are so obviously true that we refuse to doubt them, even where we believe that many people disagree. Following Fritz and McPherson, I call our behaviour in such cases ‘moral steadfastness’. In this paper, I argue for two metaethical implications of moral steadfastness. I first argue that morally steadfast behaviour is sufficiently prevalent to present an important challenge for some prominent analogies between moral epistemology and non-moral forms of epistemology. These analogies are often pressed by moral realists. I then argue that moral quasi-realism, unlike realism, can explain and vindicate our presumption that moral steadfastness is frequently rational. On the assumption that we frequently act as it is rational to act, quasi-realism is therefore well placed to explain why we are so frequently morally steadfast. I conclude that this is an important respect in which quasi-realism is explanatorily preferable to realism.

Citation

Chamberlain, J. (2022). Moral realism, quasi‐realism and moral steadfastness. Ratio, 35(1), 37-48. https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12322

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jul 18, 2021
• Online Publication Date: Aug 4, 2021
• Publication Date: 2022-03
• Deposit Date: Aug 10, 2021
• Publicly Available Date: Aug 5, 2023
• Journal: Ratio
• Print ISSN: 0034-0006
• Electronic ISSN: 1467-9329
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 35
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 37-48
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12322
• Keywords: Philosophy
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/6011331
• Publisher URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rati.12322
• Additional Information: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Chamberlain, J. (2022). Moral realism, quasi-realism and moral steadfastness. Ratio, 35, 37– 48, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12322. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.