Leonard F S Wang
Does technology licensing matter for privatization?
Wang, Leonard F S; Mukherjee, Arijit; Zeng, Chenhang
ARIJIT MUKHERJEE Arijit.Mukherjee@nottingham.ac.uk
Professor of Industrial Economics
In mixed oligopolies, technology licensing from a cost-efficient firm to a cost-inefficient firm has been widely observed. This paper examines the relationship between privatization and licensing (by public or private firms) with the consideration of either a domestic or a foreign private firm. We find that i) in the case of a domestic private firm, public licensing facilitates privatization, but private licensing hinders privatization; ii) in the case of a foreign private firm, both public and private licensing facilitate privatization. Our results yield important policy implications on privatization.
|Journal Article Type||Article|
|Journal||Journal of Public Economic Theory|
|Peer Reviewed||Peer Reviewed|
|APA6 Citation||Wang, L. F. S., Mukherjee, A., & Zeng, C. (2020). Does technology licensing matter for privatization?. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 22(5), 1462-1480. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12431|
|Keywords||Economics and Econometrics; Finance; Sociology and Political Science|
This file is under embargo until Feb 18, 2022 due to copyright restrictions.
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