Outputs (3)

The order of presentation in trials: Plaintive plaintiffs (2022)
Journal Article
D'Agostino, E., & Seidmann, D. J. (2022). The order of presentation in trials: Plaintive plaintiffs. Games and Economic Behavior, 132, 328-336. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.009

Is it better to present evidence first or second in trials if witnesses cannot lie, and the litigants share all available witnesses? We address this question by defining preferences over playing games via their equilibrium correspondences. Exploiting... Read More about The order of presentation in trials: Plaintive plaintiffs.

Protecting buyers from fine print (2016)
Journal Article
D'Agostino, E., & Seidmann, D. J. (2016). Protecting buyers from fine print. European Economic Review, 89, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.05.004

Buyers typically do not read the …ne print in contracts, providing an incentive for a monopolist to draft terms which are unfavorable to buyers. We model this problem, proving that trade must then be inefficient. We show that regulation which mandate... Read More about Protecting buyers from fine print.

Bargaining in standing committees with an endogenous default (2015)
Journal Article
Anesi, V., & Seidmann, D. J. (2015). Bargaining in standing committees with an endogenous default. Review of Economic Studies, 82(3), 825-867. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv009

© The Author 2015. Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing c... Read More about Bargaining in standing committees with an endogenous default.