All Outputs (3)

Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games (2015)
Journal Article
Montero, M., Possajennikov, A., Sefton, M., & Turocy, T. L. (2016). Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games. Economic Theory, 61(1), 55-89. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0902-y

We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battlefields may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed discrete budget across battlefields. Each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to... Read More about Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games.

A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability (2015)
Journal Article
Montero, M. (2015). A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability. Games, 6(2), https://doi.org/10.3390/g6020039

This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (b... Read More about A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability.

A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players (2015)
Journal Article
Arin, J., Feltkamp, V., & Montero, M. (2015). A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players. Annals of Operations Research, 229(1), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1841-5

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Arin and Feltkamp (J Math Econ 43:855-870, 2007), which is based on Dagan et al. (Games Econ Behav 18:55-72, 1997). A... Read More about A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players.