Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism

Mackie, Penelope

Abstract

Mumford and Anjum (2014) present a new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism. Although their argument depends on the assumption that free will is, or is the exercise of, a causal power, it does not appeal to any special features of this power. Their new argument does, however, depend upon a general thesis of the incompatibility of causal powers with causal determinism. I argue that Mumford and Anjum have provided no justification for this general thesis. As a consequence, their new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism is unsuccessful.

Citation

Mackie, P. (2014). Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism. Analysis, 74(4), https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anu088

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jul 22, 2014
• Online Publication Date: Sep 5, 2014
• Publication Date: Oct 1, 2014
• Deposit Date: Jul 14, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: Jul 14, 2016
• Journal: Analysis
• Electronic ISSN: 2386-3994
• Publisher: Red de Servicios Profesionales
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 74
• Issue: 4
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anu088
• Keywords: free will, causal powers, compatibilism, determinism, causation
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/994300
• Publisher URL: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/74/4/593
• Additional Information: This is an author-produced post-print version of an article published in Analysis. It is the final version of the manuscript accepted for publication, but does not include modifications following copyediting and proof correction. For the published version, see: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/74/4/593
• Contract Date: Jul 14, 2016