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The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason

Cunningham, J J

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Abstract

We can contrast rationalising explanations of the form S φs because p with those of the form S φs because S believes that p. According the Common Kind View, the two sorts of explanation are the same. The Disjunctive View denies this. This paper sets out to elucidate the sense in which the Common Kind Theorist asserts, but the Disjunctivist denies, that the two explanations are the same. I suggest that, in the light of the distinction between kinds of explanation and particular explanations, the relevant sameness thesis is ambiguous, thus giving us two distinct versions of the Common Kind View. I then argue that the only direct arguments for Disjunctivism available in the literature fail because they only succeed in undermining one version of the Common Kind View. I finish, however, by providing a fresh argument for the Disjunctive View which aims to undermine both versions of its competitor.

Citation

Cunningham, J. J. (2019). The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason. Philosophical Quarterly, 69(275), 235-257. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy019

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Feb 9, 2018
Online Publication Date Nov 28, 2018
Publication Date 2019-04
Deposit Date Aug 19, 2021
Publicly Available Date Aug 20, 2021
Journal Philosophical Quarterly
Print ISSN 0031-8094
Electronic ISSN 1467-9213
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 69
Issue 275
Pages 235-257
DOI https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy019
Keywords Philosophy
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/5884354
Publisher URL https://academic.oup.com/pq/article/69/275/235/5212896
Additional Information This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Philosophical Quarterly following peer review. The version of record, J J Cunningham, The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason, The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 69, Issue 275, April 2019, Pages 235–257, is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy019

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