Knowledgeably Responding to Reasons

Cunningham, Joseph

Abstract

Jennifer Hornsby has defended the Reasons-Knowledge Thesis (RKT): the claim that Φ -ing because p requires knowing that p, where the ‘because’ at issue is a rationalising ‘because’. She defends (RKT) by appeal to the thought that it provides the best explanation of why the subject in a certain sort of Gettier case fails to be in a position to Φ because p. Dustin Locke and, separately, Nick Hughes, present some modified barn-façade cases which (a) seem to constitute counterexamples to (RKT) and (b) undermine Hornsby’s way of motivating it by rendering their alternative Reasons-Explanation Thesis (RET) a better explanation of Hornsby’s datum. This paper defends (RKT) and Hornsby’s argument for it against those objections. First, I point out that their supposedly intuitive verdict about the relevant barn-façade cases is not as intuitive as they think. Second, I point out that even if we share the intuition: we have strong reason to doubt the verdict anyway. And finally, I point out that since (RET) is independently implausible, the two problems can be tackled anyway.

Citation

Cunningham, J. (2020). Knowledgeably Responding to Reasons. Erkenntnis, 85(3), 673-692. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0043-3

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jul 10, 2018
• Online Publication Date: Jul 25, 2018
• Publication Date: 2020-06
• Deposit Date: Aug 19, 2021
• Publicly Available Date: Aug 20, 2021
• Journal: Erkenntnis
• Print ISSN: 0165-0106
• Electronic ISSN: 1572-8420
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 85
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 673-692
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0043-3
• Keywords: Philosophy
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/5884327
• Publisher URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-018-0043-3