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Outputs (23)

Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons (2021)
Journal Article
Cunningham, J. J. (2022). Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 105(2), 385-405. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12825

It's one thing to do the right thing. It's another to be creditable for doing the right thing. Being creditable for doing the right thing requires that one does the right thing out of a morally laudable motive and that there is a non-accidental fit b... Read More about Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons.

Abolishing The Police (2021)
Book
DUFF, K., ROSSDALE, C., SHAHVISI, A., KEMP, T., AMIS, P., WOODMAN, C., CHOWDHURY, T., HUDSON, B., BRUCE-JONES, E., LOICK, D., AITCHISON, G., LAMBLE, S., BRAZZELL, M., & THOMPSON, V. E. (2021). K. DUFF (Ed.). Abolishing The Police. Dog Section Press

“This is the first time we are seeing… a conversation about defunding, and some people having a conversation about abolishing the police and prison state. This must be what it felt like when people were talking about abolishing slavery.” – Patrisse C... Read More about Abolishing The Police.

Re-asserting the Specialness of Health Care (2021)
Journal Article
Rumbold, B. (2021). Re-asserting the Specialness of Health Care. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 46(3), 272-296. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhab006

Is health care “special”? That is, do we have moral reason to treat health care differently from how we treat other sorts of social goods? Intuitively, perhaps, we might think the proper response is “yes.” However, to date, philosophers have often st... Read More about Re-asserting the Specialness of Health Care.

Kripke was right even if he was wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the unicorns (2021)
Journal Article
Noonan, H. (2021). Kripke was right even if he was wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the unicorns. Disputatio, 13(60), 51-69. https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0003

In the Addenda to Naming and Necessity (1980), Kripke famously argues that it is false that there could have been unicorns, or more properly, that ‘no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which there would have been unicorns.’ H... Read More about Kripke was right even if he was wrong: Sherlock Holmes and the unicorns.

The Scandal of Deduction and Aristotle’s Method for Discovering Syllogisms (2021)
Journal Article
Duncombe, M. (2021). The Scandal of Deduction and Aristotle’s Method for Discovering Syllogisms. Rhizomata, 8(2), 289-311. https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2020-0013

(1) If a deductive argument is valid, then the conclusion is not novel. (2) If the conclusion of an argument is not novel, the argument is not useful. So, (3) if a deductive argument is valid, it is not useful. This conclusion, (3), is unacceptable.... Read More about The Scandal of Deduction and Aristotle’s Method for Discovering Syllogisms.

Between Vulnerability and Resilience: A Contextualist Picture of Protective Epistemic Character Traits (2021)
Journal Article
Monypenny, A. (2021). Between Vulnerability and Resilience: A Contextualist Picture of Protective Epistemic Character Traits. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 55(2), 358-370. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12554

In this paper, I argue that focusing on resilience education fails to appropriately reflect the socio-political nature of character. I define protective epistemic character traits (PECTs) as epistemic character traits which aid students in avoiding,... Read More about Between Vulnerability and Resilience: A Contextualist Picture of Protective Epistemic Character Traits.

Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way (2021)
Journal Article
Noonan, H. (2021). Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way. Metaphysica, 22(2), 263-283. https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0007

Two of the main contenders in the debate about personal persistence over time are the neo-Lockean psychological continuity view and animalism as defended by Olson and Snowdon. Both are wrong. The position I shall argue for, which I call, following Ol... Read More about Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way.

No Trust is Hybrid: Reply to Faulkner (2021)
Journal Article
Noonan, H. (2021). No Trust is Hybrid: Reply to Faulkner. Philosophia, 49(5), 2189 - 2195. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00341-7

There is a well-developed literature on trust. In his important article Paul Faulkner (2015) distinguishes three-place, two-place and one-place trust predicates. He then argues that our more basic notions of trust are expressed by the one-place and t... Read More about No Trust is Hybrid: Reply to Faulkner.