Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way

Noonan, Harold

Abstract

Two of the main contenders in the debate about personal persistence over time are the neo-Lockean psychological continuity view and animalism as defended by Olson and Snowdon. Both are wrong. The position I shall argue for, which I call, following Olson, the hybrid view, takes (non-branching) psychological continuity as a sufficient but, pace the neo-Lockeans, not necessary condition for personal persistence. It sides with the animalist in allowing that mere (non-branching) biological continuity is also sufficient. So I am, in a sense, a psychological continuity theorist. But I am also in a sense, a biological theorist (or as Olson put it, a new animalist)

Citation

Noonan, H. (2021). Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way. Metaphysica, 22(2), 263-283. https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0007

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Dec 17, 2020
• Online Publication Date: Mar 12, 2021
• Publication Date: Mar 12, 2021
• Deposit Date: Jan 4, 2021
• Publicly Available Date: Mar 13, 2022
• Journal: Metaphysica
• Print ISSN: 1437-2053
• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 22
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 263-283
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0007
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/5197905
• Publisher URL: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/mp-2020-0007/html
• Additional Information: Noonan, H. W. (2021). Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way. Metaphysica, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0007