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Outputs (38)

The Tawḥīds of Ibn Taymiyya (2024)
Book Chapter
Hoover, J. (in press). The Tawḥīds of Ibn Taymiyya. In W. Amin, S. Rizvi, & A. Hughes (Eds.), Islamic Perspectives on God and (Other) Monotheism(s). AMI Press

The Route to Artificial Phenomenology; ‘Attunement to the World’ and Representationalism of Affective States (2023)
Book Chapter
Farina, L. (2023). The Route to Artificial Phenomenology; ‘Attunement to the World’ and Representationalism of Affective States. In C. Misselhorn, T. Poljanšek, T. Störzinger, & M. Klein (Eds.), Emotional Machines: Perspectives from Affective Computing and Emotional Human-Machine Interaction (111-132). Springer (part of Springer Nature). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-37641-3_5

According to dominant views in affective computing, artificial systems e.g. robots and algorithms cannot experience emotion because they lack the phenomenological aspect associated with emotional experience. In this paper I suggest that if we wish to... Read More about The Route to Artificial Phenomenology; ‘Attunement to the World’ and Representationalism of Affective States.

Truthmaker Accounts of Propositions (2022)
Book Chapter
Jago, M. (2022). Truthmaker Accounts of Propositions. In C. Tillman, & A. R. Murray (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge

The Evolutionary Debunking Of Quasi-realism (2022)
Book Chapter
Sinclair, N., & Chamberlain, J. (2023). The Evolutionary Debunking Of Quasi-realism. In D. E. Machuca (Ed.), Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics, and Epistemology (33-55). London: Taylor & Francis (Routledge)

In “The Evolutionary Debunking of Quasi-Realism,” Neil Sinclair and James Chamberlain present a novel answer that quasi-realists can pro-vide to a version of the reliability challenge in ethics—which asks for an explanation of why our moral... Read More about The Evolutionary Debunking Of Quasi-realism.

The First Person and ‘The First Person’ (2022)
Book Chapter
Noonan, H. (2022). The First Person and ‘The First Person’. In R. Teichmann (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of Elizabeth Anscombe (397-412). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190887353.013.25

In ‘The First Person’ Anscombe argues that ‘I’ is not a referring expression: ‘I’ is neither a name nor another kind of expression whose logical role is to make a reference, at all. Her no-reference thesis has met with general incredulity. This chapt... Read More about The First Person and ‘The First Person’.

Personal Identity and Morality (2022)
Book Chapter
Noonan, H. (2022). Personal Identity and Morality. In K. Tobia (Ed.), Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the Self (87-97). Bloomsbury Publishing. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350246928.0011

Does the true account of personal identity undermine everyday moral thinking? Do every day moral practices presuppose a false account of our nature and persistence conditions? I shall consider the three main accounts of personal identity in the conte... Read More about Personal Identity and Morality.

The Hybrid Account of Personal Persistence (2021)
Book Chapter
Curtis, B., & Noonan, H. (2021). The Hybrid Account of Personal Persistence. In J. Noller (Ed.), The unity of a person : philosophical perspectives. Routledge

In this paper we argue that persons should be defined as being things that are sometimes capable of first-person thought. We then defend an account (the Hybrid Account) of their persistence conditions. According to it psychological continuity and bio... Read More about The Hybrid Account of Personal Persistence.