The Hybrid Account of Personal Persistence

Curtis, Benjamin; Noonan, Harold

Abstract

In this paper we argue that persons should be defined as being things that are sometimes capable of first-person thought. We then defend an account (the Hybrid Account) of their persistence conditions. According to it psychological continuity and biological continuity are each sufficient for the persistence of persons, and their disjunction is necessary. We also discuss a recent paper by Olson and Witt (2020) and show that their arguments in that paper fail. Doing so enables us to clarify how the Hybrid Account relates to psychological and animalist accounts of personal persistence, and so helps to clarify the Hybrid Account further.

Citation

Curtis, B., & Noonan, H. (2021). The Hybrid Account of Personal Persistence. In J. Noller (Ed.), The unity of a person : philosophical perspectives. Routledge

• Publication Date: Sep 24, 2021
• Deposit Date: Oct 18, 2021
• Publicly Available Date: Mar 25, 2023
• Publisher: Routledge
• Book Title: The unity of a person : philosophical perspectives
• Chapter Number: 2
• ISBN: 9780367722838
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/6500853
• Publisher URL: https://www.routledge.com/The-Unity-of-a-Person-Philosophical-Perspectives/Noller/p/book/9780367722838
• Additional Information: This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge/CRC Press in The unity of a person : philosophical perspectives on 24.09.2021, available online: https://www.routledge.com/The-Unity-of-a-Person-Philosophical-Perspectives/Noller/p/book/9780367722838