On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons

Sinclair, Neil

Abstract

According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to Φ then it must be possible that A should Φ for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-called ‘internalist’ theories of reasons. In this paper I rebut an apparent counterexamples to Williams’ claim: Schroeder’s (2007) example of Nate. I argue that this counterexample fails since it underestimates the range of cases where agents can act for their normative reasons. Moreover, I argue that a key motivation behind Williams’ claim is compatible with this ‘expansive’ account of what it is to act for a normative reason.

Citation

Sinclair, N. (in press). On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19(5), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9731-8

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Apr 29, 2016
• Online Publication Date: May 8, 2016
• Deposit Date: May 18, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: May 18, 2016
• Journal: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
• Print ISSN: 1386-2820
• Electronic ISSN: 1572-8447
• Publisher: Springer Verlag
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 19
• Issue: 5
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9731-8
• Keywords: Action; normative reason; practical deliberation; reasons internalism; Schroeder; Williams
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/790895
• Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9731-8
• Contract Date: May 18, 2016