Hypocritical Blame, Fairness, and Standing

Roadevin, Cristina

Abstract

This paper argues that hypocritical blame renders blame inappropriate. Someone should not express her blame if she is guilty of the same thing for which she is blaming others, in the absence of an admission of fault. In failing to blame herself for the same violations of norms she condemns in another, the hypocrite evinces important moral faults, which undermine her right to blame. The hypocrite refuses or culpably fails to admit her own mistakes, while at the same time demands that others admit theirs. The paper argues that this lack of reciprocity—expecting others to take morality seriously by apologizing for their faults, without one doing the same in return—is what makes hypocritical blame unfair.

Citation

Roadevin, C. (2018). Hypocritical Blame, Fairness, and Standing. Metaphilosophy, 48(1-2), 137-152. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12281

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Jan 3, 2018
• Publication Date: 2018-01
• Deposit Date: Feb 24, 2025
• Journal: Metaphilosophy
• Print ISSN: 0026-1068
• Electronic ISSN: 1467-9973
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 48
• Issue: 1-2
• Pages: 137-152
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12281
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/45849092
• Publisher URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/meta.12281