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Mental health pluralism

French, Craig

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Abstract

In addressing the question of what mental health is we might proceed as if there is a single phenomenon—mental health—denoted by a single overarching concept. The task, then, is to provide an informative analysis of this concept which applies to all and only instances of mental health, and which illuminates what it is to be mentally healthy. In contrast, mental health pluralism is the idea that there are multiple mental health phenomena denoted by multiple concepts of mental health. Analysis and illumination of mental health may still be possible, but there isn’t a single phenomenon or concept to be analysed in addressing the question of what mental health is. The question of pluralism has been overlooked in the philosophy of mental health. The discussion to follow is an attempt to get us to take mental health pluralism seriously. To that end, in this essay I have three primary goals: (1) to give a precise account of what mental health pluralism is, (2) to show that the question of pluralism should not be neglected in debate about what mental health is, and (3) to argue for mental health pluralism. I also draw out some implications of this discussion for philosophy, science, and psychotherapy.

Citation

French, C. (2024). Mental health pluralism. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-024-10233-8

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Oct 21, 2024
Online Publication Date Nov 13, 2024
Publication Date Nov 13, 2024
Deposit Date Nov 6, 2024
Publicly Available Date Nov 14, 2025
Journal Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
Print ISSN 1386-7423
Electronic ISSN 1572-8633
Publisher Springer Verlag
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-024-10233-8
Keywords Mental health; Pluralism; Monism; Well-being; Philosophy of health; Health; Positive psychology
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/41549549
Publisher URL https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11019-024-10233-8#
Additional Information Accepted: 16 October 2024; First Online: 13 November 2024; : ; : The author has no conflict of interest to declare that are relevant to the content of this article.; : This is a purely philosophical/conceptual study for which no ethical approvals or consents are required.

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