Presentism, Endurance and Object-Dependence

Noonan, Harold W.

Abstract

According to the presentist the present time is the only one that there is. Nevertheless, things persist. Most presentists think that things persist by enduring. Employing Jonathan Lowe’s notion of identity-dependence, Tallant argues that presentism is incompatible with any notion of persistence, even endurance. This consequence of Lowe’s ideas, if soundly drawn, is important. The presentist who chooses to deny persistence outright is a desperate figure. However, though Lowe’s notion is a legitimate and worthwhile one, this application is faulty. The incompatibility of presentism and persistence is not part of Lowe’s heritage. A positive conclusion can be drawn. A form of persistence is compatible with presentism. It is one on which persistence is defined in tensed terms using an adverbial tense operator: x persists iff x exists and existed or will exist. Unsurprisingly, so understood persistence is endurance. The commonly held view is correct.

Citation

Noonan, H. W. (2020). Presentism, Endurance and Object-Dependence. Inquiry, 63(9-10), 1115-1122. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1698458

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Nov 12, 2019
• Online Publication Date: Dec 9, 2019
• Publication Date: 2020
• Deposit Date: Nov 20, 2019
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 10, 2021
• Journal: Inquiry
• Print ISSN: 0020-174X
• Electronic ISSN: 1502-3923
• Publisher: Routledge
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 63
• Issue: 9-10
• Pages: 1115-1122
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1698458
• Keywords: Endurance; Object-dependence; Lowe; Presentism
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/3342696
• Publisher URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1698458
• Additional Information: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry on 09/12/19, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1698458
• Contract Date: Nov 20, 2019