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Testing the “China Model” of Meritocratic Promotions: Do Democracies Reward Less Competent Ministers Than Autocracies?

Lee, Don S.; Schuler, Paul J.

Authors

Don S. Lee

Paul J. Schuler



Abstract

Proponents of the "China Model" suggest that autocracies, particularly in East Asia, reward competence more than democracies. However, a competing literature argues that autocracies are less likely to reward competence because autocrats fear that competent officials could challenge for power. We argue that autocracies do not fear technical competence; they fear political competence. As such, autocracies may promote ministers with technical competence but punish the politically competent. Democracies, by contrast, place a premium on political competence when deciding whom to promote. We provide the first test of this theory on how ministerial behavior is rewarded using a unique dataset of political performance and promotions in nine East Asian countries. Our findings show that autocracies promote officials with technical competence as long as the ministers limit their political behavior. In democracies, parliamentary and presidential democracies promote those displaying political competence.

Citation

Lee, D. S., & Schuler, P. J. (2020). Testing the “China Model” of Meritocratic Promotions: Do Democracies Reward Less Competent Ministers Than Autocracies?. Comparative Political Studies, 53(3-4), 531-566. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019858962

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date May 27, 2019
Online Publication Date Jul 4, 2019
Publication Date Mar 1, 2020
Deposit Date Jun 17, 2019
Publicly Available Date Jun 17, 2019
Journal Comparative Political Studies
Print ISSN 0010-4140
Electronic ISSN 1552-3829
Publisher SAGE Publications
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 53
Issue 3-4
Pages 531-566
DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019858962
Keywords comparative regime types, East and Southeast Asia, cabinet ministers
Public URL https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/2196940
Publisher URL https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414019858962

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