Testing the “China Model” of Meritocratic Promotions: Do Democracies Reward Less Competent Ministers Than Autocracies?

Lee, Don S.; Schuler, Paul J.

Abstract

Proponents of the "China Model" suggest that autocracies, particularly in East Asia, reward competence more than democracies. However, a competing literature argues that autocracies are less likely to reward competence because autocrats fear that competent officials could challenge for power. We argue that autocracies do not fear technical competence; they fear political competence. As such, autocracies may promote ministers with technical competence but punish the politically competent. Democracies, by contrast, place a premium on political competence when deciding whom to promote. We provide the first test of this theory on how ministerial behavior is rewarded using a unique dataset of political performance and promotions in nine East Asian countries. Our findings show that autocracies promote officials with technical competence as long as the ministers limit their political behavior. In democracies, parliamentary and presidential democracies promote those displaying political competence.

Citation

Lee, D. S., & Schuler, P. J. (2020). Testing the “China Model” of Meritocratic Promotions: Do Democracies Reward Less Competent Ministers Than Autocracies?. Comparative Political Studies, 53(3-4), 531-566. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019858962

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 27, 2019
• Online Publication Date: Jul 4, 2019
• Publication Date: Mar 1, 2020
• Deposit Date: Jun 17, 2019
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 17, 2019
• Journal: Comparative Political Studies
• Print ISSN: 0010-4140
• Electronic ISSN: 1552-3829
• Publisher: SAGE Publications
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 53
• Issue: 3-4
• Pages: 531-566
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019858962
• Keywords: comparative regime types, East and Southeast Asia, cabinet ministers
• Public URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/2196940
• Publisher URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414019858962
• Contract Date: Jun 17, 2019