Risk, networks and privateering in Liverpool during the Seven Years’ War, 1756–1763

Privateering has often been portrayed as a particularly risky business. Some historians have posited that it was undertaken only by disreputable merchants, whilst others have argued that profits would not have been made if systems of control had been absent, and that merchants were in fact rational when they invested in privateering. So far, however, no one has sought to gauge or measure the perceived riskiness of privateering by the merchants themselves, and the rationality of those who participated in it. Using the Seven Years’ War as a case study, this article seeks to measure the extent to which Liverpool merchants perceived privateering to be a risky proposition. As a measurement of the perception of risk, the network size in Liverpool’s privateering voyages is compared to those in the Liverpool slave trade, another trade known to be risky, but one in which Liverpool merchants excelled. In the case of ‘private men of war’, the network size was usually at least as large as those in the slave trade, and often larger. Therefore, the analysis presented here demonstrates that Liverpool’s merchants did perceive privateering – especially its ‘deep-water’ variant – as a particularly risky activity during the Seven Years’ War. By their use of their networks, however, through which they both spread risk, and brought in wider financial and human capital, they were essentially rational in their pursuit of this particular business.

Privateering, 'the setting out of privately owned vessels licensed by the State to appropriate the seaborne property of enemy subjects in wartime', has been an important part of maritime war since at least the Elizabethan period. 1 Indeed, whilst its cousin piracy had been mostly eradicated by the 1730s, the use of privateering for personal profit with benefits to the state was becoming more valued. 2 Some historians, such as Larry Neal, have argued that the role played by privateers was minimal. However, it is now more widely accepted that although contemporaries complained about the abuses and problems associated with privateering, it benefitted the state and individuals both militarily and economically. 3 Nevertheless, there are some who argue that privateering was undertaken by disreputable merchants who took captures by chance, competed with the Navy for men, and were a slender cover for piracy. N. A. M. Rodger, for example, is derogatory about privateers, stating that only 'the most reckless gambler' would join such a vessel. 4 Certainly the risks were huge (and real for the seamen), but there is no doubt that for some merchants, taking risks (perceived or otherwise), was worth the financial reward. For example, some were involved in smuggling, thinking the potential windfall profits worth the risk. Occasionally, these were young men new to trade, but working outside the law required capital, and good, trustworthy networks. 5 David Starkey agrees there was a risk in privateering, both financial for the merchants, and physical for the sailors. However, in comparison to Rodger, he argues that without good discipline the privateers were unlikely to achieve their aims, and that there is evidence to suggest that the systems of control were 'sufficient to curb the worst excesses'. 6 These included bail bonds and guarantees for good conduct. 7 Indeed, Jeremy Black adds that privateering offered an opportunity to merchants and sailors when normal trade was suppressed, providing commerce and employment to those who took 'independent initiatives '. 8 There is no doubt that privateering was perceived as a risky enterprise, and it was often linked with the wider eighteenth-century discourse concerning gambling; which was increasingly becoming associated with fraud and criminality amongst the lower orders, and solitary corruption amongst the elite. In wartime, however, privateering could be seen as a patriotic behaviour, similarly to investing in East India Company stock or government consuls, including by 'ladies'. 9 Indeed, the Earl of Derby praised the Liverpool merchants for their 'spirit of enterprise which had stimulated them to exert themselves so much against the enemy'. 10 To some extent of course, taking the calculated risk of privateering was different from gambling, and Starkey acknowledges that those who made extravagant gains were probably the fortunate few. He also argues, however, that enough privateers made enough profit to demonstrate not only the viability of commerce raiding but its 'essential rationality'. 11 So far, however, no one has sought to gauge or measure the perceived riskiness of privateering by the merchants themselves, and the rationality of those who engaged in it.
This article seeks to measure, for the first time, the extent to which Liverpool merchants perceived privateering to be a risky proposition during the Seven Years' War, and to consider whether they were rational in their pursuit of it. As a measurement of the perception of risk, the network size of Liverpool's privateering voyages is compared to those in the Liverpool slave trade, another trade known to be risky, but in which the Liverpool merchants excelled. 12 It also compares those trading vessels which held privateering licences simply to protect themselves on normal commercial voyages (known as 'letter of marque' vessels), with 'private men of war', which were more heavily manned and armed to engage in more aggressive and therefore more risky enterprises. Liverpool during the Seven Years' War provides a good case study because it was then that privateering became less centralised and moved to the outports, and, increasingly, to Liverpool, where capital and labour were available in abundance. 13 Liverpool had also just taken over as the leading port in the slave trade, making this period a good benchmark for the purposes of comparison. 14 9. Donna T. Andrew,

Methodology
All of the declarations made by those applying for privateering licences in respect of Liverpool vessels during the Seven Years' War were collated. This comprised the declarations made in London (HCA 26) by the merchants' representatives, and those made in Liverpool (HCA 25), often by the ships' captains themselves. 15 There were occasionally duplicate licences. This occurred when there was a change in captain or ownership and a new license was required rather than representing a separate journey. 16 To avoid repetition these have been omitted. However, where there was a second declaration made after the declared length of the first voyage, this has been counted as a second voyage, and in a few cases a third voyage occurred and is also included as such. 17 This article therefore refers to voyages, as opposed to vessels, and a total of 295 individual voyages were identified. 18 The declarations list the crew, as well as the number of sails, small arms, and cordage amongst other accoutrements, but unfortunately not the destination, as this was not required by the Admiralty at this time. They also list the 'setters out', the investors in the enterprise. On a few occasions, the declarations list only one merchant even when they were not the 'sole owner', noting them as the 'principal setter out', or simply stating 'and others'. This tended to occur more with the declarations made in Liverpool, where the investors in any voyage were probably well known, and/or bureaucracy was lax. However, enough full lists were made to provide a good estimation of the number of total 'setters out' (hereafter investors) and a sense of the size of the average networks (if slightly under recorded). The remainder of this article is structured as follows: the first section analyses the wider patterns of commission holding for all of Liverpool's licenced vessels during the Seven Years' War. The second looks in more detail at those involved in the more aggressive 'private men of war' and the main merchants involved. The third section compares the networks of seven case study investors in private men of war, with their investments in the slave trade. This facilitates a consideration of the perceived degree of riskiness in privateering and an assessment of the merchants' rationality in their pursuit of it. The fourth and final section concludes that engaging in private men of war was indeed perceived as a risky enterprise by Liverpool merchants, and as risky as (and sometimes more so than) the slave trade. However, they were rational in their pursuit of it by counteracting that risk with larger networks which spread the risk -albeit the financial rewards as well.

Liverpool privateering during the Seven Years' War
As noted above, privateering became less centralised during the eighteenth century. Table 1 highlights the move towards Liverpool over the eighteenth century. It is clear that by the beginning of the Seven Years' War Liverpool accounted for a significant proportion of the British privateering force.
Liverpool's trading community was known as a relatively open commercial group, in which newcomers could potentially make their fortune. 19 This might have been because there were no guilds in the town, which may also partly account for Liverpool's reputation for being shrewd in business practices. It has been argued, for example, that Liverpool merchants were able to take advantage of locational factors such as transport links for manufacturing goods, were able to gain longer credit periods than their rivals for those goods, and could therefore keep seamen's wages low. 20 Liverpool had recently become the leading outport in the slave trade, 21 mainly because its merchants were particularly good at adapting to African credit customs such as pawnship, and in finding new places for trade on the African coast. 22 They were also amongst the first to adopt the guarantee system, which ensured payments from West India planters. 23 There is no doubting they also used shrewd business practices in privateering. Seaman working in private men of war received no wages -just their (small) share of any prizes, and even those working in 'letter of marque' vessels were not rewarded with increased wages for 19 the higher risks of working in wartime. Financial risk was also shared between the various investors, and many charges, such as benefits to dependents of those killed in action, were paid before the prize money was distributed. 24 No doubt their general acuity in business helped Liverpool merchants in privateering too. Figure 1 shows the networks of all the Liverpool merchants who invested in licenced vessels during the Seven Years' War, when commissions were issued from June 1756 to the end of 1762. 25 It is clear that there was a central, dense network, with many outliers -groups of investors in small and often isolated networks. Many of the outliers were in investor groups of one, two or three, which was in fact the normal range of merchants for peacetime commercial ventures. The dense centre however, shows that there were many interconnections between merchants, often investing in the same vessels together in a variety of network groups, although some persistently invested together, as will be shown below. There were clearly quite a few actors who were at the centre of these networks and who were well connected.
In 1759, the Privateers Act was enacted to placate the Dutch and other neutrals, who complained of smaller predatory vessels attacking neutral vessels along the coast. These smaller vessels were supposed to be the 'sacrificial lamb'. 27 A 'rule of thumb' can be derived from the Act to calculate whether or not a vessel was acting as an aggressive privateering vessel. This rough measure is based on the manning to tonnage ratio. Those vessels with a manning to tonnage ratio of less than 1:2.5 can be considered 'letters of marque' vessels, engaged in a normal trading voyage, but holding a licence in order to profit from any successful defensive action. Most captains and owners obtained a commission as a default position, because if a merchantman took a vessel on defending itself without a licence, any goods taken became the property of the state. 28 Those with a higher manning to tonnage ratio of more than 1:2.5 can be cast as 'private men of war', which embarked on cruises with the intention of taking prizes rather than carrying cargoes. Those with this higher manning to tonnage ratio, but of less than 100 tons have been termed 'channel' privateers, as they tended to operate in the English Channel, attacking neutral and enemy vessels off the French coast. The larger, heavily manned private men of war ventured into the Atlantic or the Caribbean, and have been described as 'deep-water' vessels that sought to capture large, valuable vessels returning from the French Caribbean and Spanish mainland colonies. Both were cruise and attack voyages, aggressively seeking to board and take vessels, with trading a secondary consideration, if at all. The Fame cruised in the Caribbean, for example, and took French and Dutch prizes into Kingston, Jamaica, whilst the Manderin cruised the English Channel. 29 The 'patriotic intentions' of these vessels were advertised in the local newspapers; in 1756, the Anson was advertised as 'ready to cruise against the French', and the Grand Buck was 'ready to sail against the French'. 30 The 1759 Act, in trying to curb the activities of 'channel' privateers, provided a means to categorise all the privateering vessels, and this article follows Starkey, who devised these categorisations.
Of the 295 voyages recorded for Liverpool, 272 (92.2% of the total) were undertaken by 'letter of marque' vessels engaged in non-aggressive voyages. Therefore, most of the networks in Figure 1 represent trading vessels which held a privateering licence in case the crew needed to defend themselves. Whilst the average network size for all privateering voyages from Liverpool was 2.55, that for 'letters of marque' vessels was only 2.2, about the same size as partnerships in normal trading conditions. Clearly, most 27 merchants did not increase their network size in order to spread risk in a time of war, but instead relied on existing networks of trust. This is not as surprising as it seems, as many merchants trenched their networks in periods of crisis. 31 They would, of course, have paid more for insurance, especially if they sailed without a convoy; 'the premium being proportional to the distance, danger of seas, enemies etc.'. 32 However, as Adrian Leonard has argued, 'marine insurance helped Britain to transform violence at sea into a national strength'. 33 Liverpool merchants therefore overwhelmingly concentrated on 'letter of marque' vessels, and these merchants were probably risk-averse on the whole.

'Private men of war'
With regard to 'private men of war' activity, a very different pattern emerges. Of the total 295 licences issued in respect of Liverpool vessels, only 23 voyages (7.8%), were cruise and attack voyages. 34 Of these, five vessels were under 99 tons -and can be classed as 'channel privateers'. The remaining 15 vessels are deemed to have been 'deep-water' vessels. Arguably, the merchants involved in these voyages were prepared to take more risk. Despite this, many sailed uninsured. This was because even when they were insured, the cover was often inadequate and the premium very high. 35 Figure 2 shows the investment networks of 'private men of war' (both 'channel' and 'deep water') in Liverpool, 1756-1762. In all, 61 different Liverpool merchants were involved in these riskier voyages at least once. This was quite a sizeable part (27.85%) of the port's merchants, which numbered 219 by 1766. 36 The mean investor network size for all 'private men of war' was 4.09. 37 However, it is clear that two types of investment groups were at play. There were several small investment groups, including three merchants who invested as 'sole setters out': Richard Savage, George Campbell and Thomas Parke. John Hulton & Co. is an anomaly, because whilst he did invest in the Manderin (noted above) and the Revenge alone as John Hulton & Co., he was named in large investment groups for other vessels as John Hulton. 38  manning his prizes, which were laden with lucrative cargoes of sugar, coffee and indigo. 41 Despite their aggressive nature, 'channel' voyages had smaller, or sole, investor groups; the average network size was only 2.2. Even this is skewed by the inclusion of the Alice, of 80 tons, with seven investors. The Antigua was more representative with two investors, and the other three, only one. This may be because the cost of the vessel, equipment and crew would have been less for these smaller vessels, which embarked on relatively short cruises. It is likely therefor, that 'channel' privateering voyages were perceived to have less financial risk. However, not all the smaller groups were 'channel' vessels. The Fame, Jenny, Fox, St. George, King of Prussia, Adventure and the Spy were all 'deep-water' vessels with small investment groups. These appear to have been genuinely small investment groups, rather than it being a matter of under recording, as more than one name is listed in each case. Many of those involved in these smaller groups invested in only one or two privateering voyages. However, most 'deep-water' cruises were financed by larger investment groups; they averaged 4.55 investors per voyage. Of those, only the investors of the Hawk (five investors, centre right in Figure 2) were isolated. All the others were closely interconnected, particularly around some key actors: for example, John Hulton, Thomas Wakefield, Henry Hardwar and James Gildart. Indeed, John Hulton on his own, or acting as part of his merchant house, invested in the most 'private man of war' ventures, along with Henry Hardwar, at five apiece. John Hulton was also one of only four merchants who invested in both 'channel' and 'deep-water' vessels. The others were Richard Trafford, George Campbell (& Co.), and James Appleton. Table 2 outlines Liverpool's leading 'private men of war' investors, the number of voyages in which they were involved, and their mean network size.
It is not clear whether experience drove merchants to larger networks or vice versa, but the average mean investor network size for 'deep-water' vessels at 4.55 is much larger than that of the 'channel' privateers (2.2), and considerably higher than the mean network size of the whole 'private man of war' group at 4.09 (94 investments/23 vessels). Given that some investors are missing from the declarations, the mean number of investors is probably higher than this. Indeed, many of the individual merchants' network groups were much higher. Henry Hardwar's was 7.20, James Gildart's 7.00, James Appleton's 7.50, William Williamson's 7.67, John Tarleton's 7.00, William Earle's 8.33, and William Hutchinson's 9; John Hulton's average (4.6) is relatively low due to his engagement in 'channel' cruises. Clearly, 'deep-water' ventures were perceived as much riskier than 'channel' ventures and normal commercial voyages.
Significantly, the mean network size for 'deep-water' voyages was very similar to the average size of Liverpool's slave trade networks at this time. Over the eighteenth century, Liverpool's slave trading networks ranged from a mean low of one owner (at the beginning and end of the century), to a high of 5.5. The highest average means were to be found when Liverpool assumed a leading role in the slave trade down to the 1790s when these networks coalesced. During the Seven Years' War, the mean number of investors in slave trade voyages ranged from around five in 1756 to four in 1763. McDade argues that these relatively large investment groups spread risk in terms of numbers, but 41. Williams, History of the Liverpool Privateers, 90-2. also by bringing together financial, human and social capital. 42 The fact that the mean network size of 'deep-water' vessels was larger than those of slave trade networks at the same time strongly suggests that the Liverpool merchants perceived that 'deep-water' cruises were riskier than voyages in the slave trade.
Indeed, many of those prepared to risk investing in 'private men of war' were also involved in the slave trade. Some 39 merchants, or 65 per cent of all investors in 'private men of war', were also involved to some extent in slave trading during the Seven Years' War. This is not to say that all slave traders were involved in privateering. Table 3 lists those merchants who invested in two or more 'private men of war', and where they were also involved in the slave trade, the numbers of slave trade voyages in which they invested. It is clear that most of them were also involved in the slave trade, and some of

Case studies
In order to develop the comparison with the slave trade networks further, it is worth looking at a few case studies. Table 4 shows the average network size in privateering and the slave trade of those merchants who invested in three or more 'private men of war'. Only Richard Trafford and George Campbell were involved in (limited) 'channel' privateering, so the network averages mostly refer to 'deep-water' ventures.
It is immediately noticeable that for those involved in the slave trade, the mean network size of the privateering voyages (mostly 'deep water') are all higher than the 'private men of war' mean network size of 4.09 and much higher than the mean for 'channel' privateers of 2.50. This is even the case for both Richard Trafford and George Campbell, who also invested in 'channel' privateers (with smaller network sizes). Henry Hardwar, James Gildart and William Williamson also had much higher than average network means in privateering. This suggests that these men considered privateering more risky than normal trade. However, they also spread that risk more widely, at the same time managing that risk by accessing more financial, human and social capital. It is also worth noting that Henry Hardwar, James Gildart, William Williamson and George Campbell had higher mean network sizes in privateering than they did in the slave trade. It would appear that these men assessed 'deep-water' privateering as being more risky than the slave trade, and it is clear that both of these trades were considered more risky than normal commercial activities. Figures 3 and 4 compare the networks of these merchants, as a group, in privateering and the slave trade respectively.
The case studies' privateering networks are clearly interconnected, with no clear outliers. Henry Hardwar (centre right) and James Gildart (centre) are clearly important actors. This network centres around the case studies, but these men clearly acted as 'bridges', important actors linking these networks together. 45 William Earle and William Hutchinson (also the captain of his vessel) (both bottom), were also clearly important despite not being case study actors. Figure 4 highlights the case studies' collective slave trade networks, which were vast and mostly densely connected. This makes the outliers all the more noteworthy. The investors in the Goree and the Surprize (both top right) are only linked via co-investors in the Wolfe, and there is a similar scenario for investors in the Defiance (centre left), Barbaodes Packet (top right) and the Jane (bottom). In contrast, there is a dense network (bottom right) around the Liberty and Prince Henry. If we look at these leading actors in more detail we can provide a more nuanced view of their risk management strategies. Henry Hardwar (centre right Figure 3, centre left below the Defiance in Figure 4) was one of two merchants involved in five 'private men of war' cruises. His network mean for both 'private men of war' and the slave trade were both above the average, at 7.20 and 6.08 respectively. He invested in the Liverpoole, the venture with the highest number of investors (11), as well as in the Liverpool (1757 voyage, seven investors) the Auson (six investors), and the two Anson voyages (both also six investors). In the Liverpoole he invested with other leading privateer investors, James Gildart, William Williamson and John Hulton. Other investors included the captain, William Hutchinson, and William Earle (a leading slave trader). 46 In the Liverpool, he again invested with James Gildart, Hardwar's investment in the slave trade followed a similar pattern. Although there was one voyage in which there were only three investors, the African, the remaining 11 ranged from four to ten, with the majority being six or seven. 47 Not only were there . 48 Henry Hardwar therefore not only had a larger than average mean network size in both trades, he also repeat invested with other well-known privateers and slave traders, and across those trades as well. James Gildart (centre bottom Figure 3, top left below the Fforde in Figure 4), had quite different average mean network sizes across the two trades; 7.00 for the 'private men of war' (all 'deep-water' voyages), and 4.79 for his slave trade investments. As was noted above, he repeat invested with Henry Hardwar on the Liverpoole and Liverpool voyages, although the two groups were not exactly the same. His other two voyages were the Mercury (1756 and 1757), both with Bartholomew Sherlock, Richard Trafford, Thomas Wakefield and John Hulton, the latter three being leading privateer investors. Trafford and Wakefield also invested in the slave trade. Gildart's mean slave trade trading network size is brought down by five voyages (out of a total of 14) in which he invested, unusually, with only one other person; the Upton's two voyages, the Lawrell with Abraham Barnes, and the Dove's two voyages with Hugh Williams. 49 In the remaining slave trade voyages, he invested with those with whom he had invested in privateering, such as Henry Hardwar, Sherlock Bartholomew and William Earle. On other voyages, he still invested with leading slave traders such as William Davenport. For the two voyages of the Forde, he repeat invested with Felix Doran, James Brown, Samuel Winstanley, Charles Ford (after whom the vessel was named?), William Hutton and Robert Green. James Gildart therefore repeat invested with trusted co-investors even when in a small group, and with other leading slave traders and privateers when in larger groups. We do not know the reason for this disparity, although it is worth noting that all the smaller investment group slave trade voyages were to Senegambia. Possibly Gildart perceived this destination as less risky.
William Williamson (centre bottom Figure 3, centre top above the African in Figure 4) had the highest mean network size on his 'private men of war' cruises (all 'deepwater' ventures) of 7.67 and had a mean size of above average on his slave trade voyages at 6.75. He was very well connected in the 'deep-water' voyages as well. He linked the networks of the Liverpool and Liverpoole vessels, as well as the two Anson ventures, in addition to his links with those investing in the Grand Buck via Edmund Ogden. Through 48. It is possible that there is an error on the recording of the two King George voyages, as they also have the same tonnage and the same year. However, the destination and the outcome voyages are recorded differently, so they are recorded as separate voyages here as well. See  What is noticeable in Williamson's slave trade networks is the recurrence of certain actors who were interconnected with the privateering networks. For example, Henry Hardwar was one of five other investors in the two voyages of the Glory in 1757 and 1759. The other four investors, James Clemens, Lawrence Spencer, Thomas Wycliffe and Richard Powell also invested together in both voyages. Henry Hardwar was also one of the investors in the Baltimore (1760), as were William Earle and James Gildart. Williamson's investment in the Betty (1761) did not have any cross over in investors with other slave trade voyages, or his investments in 'deep-water' vessels, but that may be why that particular group was larger -eight actors -to further spread the risk. It is clear therefore that Williamson not only spread his risk with a rational number of actors, he also repeat invested with other trusted merchants in both 'deep-water' voyages and the slave trade and, indeed, reduced his risk further by joining in with the same actors, or other well-known and experienced actors, across these trades as well.
Edmund Ogden (centre left Figure 3, centre right below the Marquis of Granby in Figure 4), is one of the three investors whose mean network size in privateering was smaller than those of his slave trade networks, at 6.67 and 15.00 respectively. He invested in three 'deep-water' vessels. One of these was the Grand Buck, in a group of eight. Interestingly, none of the other investors were leading privateering investors, an anomaly amongst the other case studies, although one was a leading slave trader, John Knight. 51 Perhaps a lack of detailed knowledge and experience accounts for the larger network size of the Grand Buck. Ogden's other two investment groups were in the Anson (both voyages) along with leading privateers George Campbell, William Williamson and Henry Hardwar, noted above. He only invested in two slave trade voyages, both with the same investors for the two voyages of the Liberty. Perhaps he did not invest more because he thought the slave trade too risky; certainly the Liberty had one of the largest investment groups in the slave trade at 15 investors. Leading slave traders were to be found amongst them, such as John and William Crosbie, but also leading privateering investors such as Richard Trafford, and Isaac Blackwood and Richardson Douglas, most likely Messrs Blackwood and Douglass who invested in the Liverpoole. 52  Knight, despite being an investor in the Grand Buck and a leading slaver, was not amongst Ogden's slave trade investment groups. Thomas Wakefield's (centre top Figure 3, centre left below the Isaac in Figure 4) networks in both trades are well above the average means. He invested in three 'private men of war', all 'deep-water' cruises, the Isaac and the Mercury's two voyages. In the first, none of the other leading privateer investors were present, although James Appleton, who invested in two 'deep-water' vessels, was there. In the case of the Mercury, the other four investors were the same in both cases, Sherlock Bartholomew, Richard Trafford, James Gildart and John Hulton, all of whom invested in two or more 'private men of war'. Wakefield only invested in one slave trade voyage during this period, the Isaac in 1758, with six other people. Three of them were also investors in the Isaac, in the 1756 privateering voyage (possibly the same vessel as the tonnages are roughly the same): Richard Townsend, Isaac Oldham (no doubt after whom the vessel was named), and Thomas Seel. Therefore, Wakefield not only rationally spread his risk, he did so with merchants he presumably trusted across both trades.
Richard Trafford's (top left Figure 3, centre right and right of the Willy in Figure 4, in the dense networks below the Perfect) average network size for both 'private men of war' and the slave trade are both above the average at 5.67 and 6.65 respectively, but still smaller than those of most of the other case studies. He is also one of the two men who also invested in 'channel' privateering (along with George Campbell), in the Alice. However, this investment group, at seven investors was much larger than the mean of 'channel' privateers, although James Appleton stands out as the only other leading investor in 'private men of war'. His brother William Trafford also invested in the Alice. 53 It is noteworthy therefore that the mean network size for his 'deep-water' investments, the Mercury and Mercury Privateer, was slightly smaller at 5.00. However, all the other investors in this group were leading privateers: James Gildart, Sherlock Bartholomew, Thomas Wakefield and John Hulton (Gildart and Wakefield being case studies also).
Trafford was by far the largest case study investor in the slave trade with 29 voyages, and only Thomas Rumbold had more slave trade investments (31) out of those privateers with two or more 'private men of war' investments. He was certainly not risk averse. He was an investor in the Liberty, with 15 investors, noted above, with other 'private men of war' investors and leading slave traders. Many of those, such as John and William Crosbie, who invested in the Liberty were also co-investors in many other slave trading voyages. Trafford also co-invested with William Trafford, and leading slave trader William Davenport. William Rankine and William Dobb also co-invested on several occasions. It is worth noting that on the five occasions when there were only four investors, the others were always John Crosbie, William Crosbie and William Trafford. 54 Richard Trafford was therefore unusual in only having his brother as a cross-trade investor. However, he always spread his risk with plenty of other investors, and when he invested in slave trade voyages in a network size smaller than the average mean for the period, it was always with the same, trusted and well-known investors, thereby reducing risk. 53 Figure 3, and centre above the Willy in Figure 4) has the smallest mean networks in both 'private men of war' and the slave trade. In this way he potentially appears as the least rational. He was involved in three privateering voyages. The first was the Blakeney Privateer, which was a 'channel' cruise, and deemed less risky. Indeed, he was the sole owner of this vessel. However, if we remove this 'channel' venture and only look at his 'deepwater' investments, the Anson, which had two voyages, his average network size was 6.00, much more in line with rational risk-spreading behaviour. Figure 3 shows that he was relatively isolated in these investments, joined only to others through William Williamson and Henry Hardwar acting as bridges, who were both far better connected. However, both the Anson voyages had exactly the same investors. Furthermore, three of them were other leading privateers, Henry Hardwar, William Williamson and Edmund Ogden. Campbell therefore chose to stay with trusted and well-known actors, as did the other case study investors.
He followed a very similar pattern in his slave trade investments, which helps to explain his relatively small mean network size in the slave trade (2.55). Indeed, Figure 4 shows him as even more isolated, and in small investment groups, even though he invested in 11 slave trade voyages, of which for three he was sole owner. 55 For a fourth journey, he invested with three others, one being James (his brother?), Samuel Laben and Thomas Thompson. For the majority, however, he was in an investment group with two others. One of these was with William Moore and Hugh Mitchell. The remaining six were all with his father, George Campbell senior, and Stephen Hayes. Whilst George Campbell had smaller networks in both trades, he was rational in that he kept joint investments to family members and merchants well known to him in each trade, although unusually there were no linkages between those with whom he invested in privateering and the slave trade.

Conclusion
This article set out to explore whether Liverpool merchants perceived privateering to be a risky business; and, if so, whether they were essentially rational in investing in it. In doing so, network size was taken as a proxy for the perceived level of risk. It compared network size in privateering with those of the slave trade at the same time. It is clear that all the Liverpool merchants who took out privateering licences for 'letter of marque' vessels acted rationally, but that this was mostly a default position in order to protect themselves, and any inadvertent profits, from the state. Against intuition, the network sizes for 'letter of marque' voyages overall were very much the same mean as for merchant partnerships in peacetime. It would appear therefore that either merchants did not perceive trade in wartime as noticeably more risky than in peace, or, and more likely, that these merchants simply retrenched their networks to those people considered the most trustworthy. 55 owners. 59 They were clearly feeling confident as the Anson was advertised later in 1756 as 'Now ready to Cruize against the French'. 60 In 1757, the King of Prussia took the snow La Favourite, invoiced at 30,000 livres, and the Liverpool (1758) took a number of prizes and sent them to Liverpool, one alone being worth US$50,000. 61 The brigantine Jenny, part owned by Tarleton & Co., took the Le Gere in the Caribbean, with 120,000 cwt of sugar, amongst other commodities, worth a considerable amount of money. 62 Of course, these are not profits as we do not know the charges against these incomes, but certainly huge profits could be made. Whilst larger network groups meant that they shared in those profits (and losses), the Liverpool merchants harnessed financial, human and social capital in doing so. These merchants may have justified to themselves and others that they were engaging in privateering as a patriotic duty in a time of war, and the analysis presented here demonstrates that they did perceive 'deep-water' privateering as a particularly risky activity. However, through their use of their networks, through which they both spread risk, and brought together wider financial and human capital, they were essentially rational in their pursuit of it.