A Modern-Day Requirement for Co-Ordinated Covert Action

Covert action can be an important weapon in a state’s arsenal. It is, however, inherently controversial and risky. Rory Cormac, Michael S Goodman and Tom Holman argue that when considering covert action, Whitehall should look to lessons from the recent past. The UK has long used covert action, and how best to manage and co-ordinate such sensitive activity was for many decades a key preoccupation of its policy-makers and politicians. Given the secrecy involved, these lessons, and the machinery created, have been lost to history. Yet with covert action seemingly now back on the agenda, previous experience and hard-learnt lessons have assumed renewed importance.

T he history of Britain'ss ecurity andi ntelligencec ommunity is long,c omplexa nd, by necessity, secretive.Afundamental featuret hat has emerged, however, is Whitehall's love of ac o-ordinating committee: whether providing all-source intelligence assessment, such as the longstanding JointI ntelligenceC ommittee (JIC), or providing at op-levels etting in which to discuss security challenges,s uch as the National SecurityC ouncil (NSC). The actual process of co-ordination and discussion undertaken by such committees is itself often as important as the outcome.I th elpst op rovide consensus (if not unanimous agreement), to ensuret hatar angeo ff actorso r voicesa re adequately considered, and to guaranteet he involvemento fa nd interaction between the intelligence and policy communities.
Despitearecentspate of official and authorisedhistories of Britishintelligence, important gaps in the literatureremain. 1 Particularly noteworthya mongt hesei s Whitehall'sa pproach to covert action. Since 1945, this hasr evolved around as eries of co-ordinating committees which waxeda nd waned with the vacillationso fe xternala nd (sometimes moreimportantly) internal politics. Their existence and activitiesa re only now, slowly,coming to light. This article arguest hatW hitehall's co-ordination of covert action in the recentpastcan offer insightthatisuseful today, when debatesa bout deniable intervention, proxyw arfare, the use of special forces, forcem ultiplication, and responses to so-called 'ambiguous' or 'hybrid'w arfared ominate security discourse. Specifically,i ta rgues that useful lessons from the 1960s-w hen the British governmentcreated theJoint Action Committee (JAC)-s hould be properly integrated into currentplanning and co-ordinating machinery.
The UK does not have ad efinition of covert action,a lthougho fficialsh ave long usedthe phrase (indeed, it is more than an Americanism thath as been assimilatedi nto the English language). Forthe purposes of this article, however, covert action is defined as intervention in theinternalaffairsofanotherstate or non-state actor in ap lausibly deniable manner.For the UK, this has long involved ab road spectrum of activity ranging from the dissemination of unattributable propaganda on the one hand, to more kinetic special operations (for example, sabotage) on the other.G iven Britain's decentralisedapproach to covert actionwhich has spanned the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS),GCHQ,the SecurityService, the Foreign Office and the militarysome sort of co-ordinating machineryis necessary, especially giventhe potential risksa nd controversy associatedw ith suchasensitive form of intervention.

Covert Action Today
Covert action is on thea genda. The UK wantstoplayaglobal leadership role but seemingly lackst he financial, political and military clout to do this as effectively as perhapsd esired. 2 SuccessiveB ritish governments, from that of Clement Attlee in the mid-1940s, have used covert action ands pecial forces as a meanso fp lugging this gapb etween ambition anda bility.T he current prime minister, David Cameron, has not been immune to this problem, falling backon similar solutions. Under his premiership, GCHQ has enhanced its 'online covert action'p rogramme, whilstt he chiefo f SIS admitted to targeting Iranian nuclear capabilities. 3 Covert action wasa lso usedi nL ibya and Cameron has pressed fors pecial forces to be sent to theatres ranging from Mali to Syria,sometimesin ac overt role, sometimes in an advisory capacity. 4 Of course,t hesea re just the instancest hath aveb een publicly acknowledged.
Covert action maya ppealt ot he current governmentf or three reasons. First,a sm entioned above, it offersa means of reconcilingr esponsibility,a nd capability,r ole and resources. Second, contemporaryc onflicts invitec overt action.V iolent non-state actorsc annot alwaysb ed efeatedm ilitarily; they operate in at ransnational environment in whicht he statem oves clumsily.I n addition, messym odernw arfareh as blurred the concepto f' victory', and to makem attersw orse,p oliticians cannot openly negotiate with terrorist groups either,g iven the potential political ramifications. This has led to ar ise in preventativeo r' disruption' operations. 5 Third, awar-wearypublic makes it more difficult forg overnments to use military force, as demonstratedb yt he two defeatsCameron suffered in the House of Commons in August2013 over proposed strikes on Syria andi nt he September 2014 authorisation of strikes againstIraq but not Syria.Polling suggests, however, thatthe public is morelikely to support the use of special forces instead. 6 Today, covert action is overseen and co-ordinatedbythe NSC and its attendant machinery, createdbyCameron in 2010. Thisi sap articularly importantf unction given the sensitivities and dangers surrounding such activity. 7 Mistakesc an be fatalfor agovernment, whilstleakscan be politically damaging and undermine internationalr elations.' Blowback',o r unintended consequences,c an create serious security threats. It is therefore crucial thata dequate consideration is given to the managementa nd co-ordination of covert action.
Despite the advento ft he NSC, problemsi nt he managemento fc overt action still exist, necessitating an examination of lessons from the recent past. The first problem is the perception of covert action as a' silver bullet'. The NSC institutionalisesc o-operation betweent he mosts enior policy-makers in the land, and militaryand intelligence chiefs.Its Libya subcommittee metmore than sixty times during the relatively short 2011 conflict. 8 Althougho nt he whole ap ositive development,s uch regular and institutionalised contact appearst o increasethe appealofcovert action. One recente xamplew as the requirementt o huntdownMohammed Emwazi (labelled 'Jihadi John' by the British press), with the prime ministert asking intelligence and security chiefs to 'fix'something after hearing the latest briefing. It is through such directa nd immediate contact and tasking thatt he appeal of covert action is increased. This is potentially dangerous insofar as sucha ctions, if demanded offhandand without detailed discussion, mayn ot necessarily be in line with broaders trategict hinking or planning. 9 This is matched by the absence of NSC mechanisms -according to AlexAllan, a former JIC chair -tooversee deliveryof these policy options,leavingdepartments and lead ministers responsible. 10 This could further hamperinterdepartmental co-ordination and scrutinyo fc overt action,p otentially undermininge xtant strategy further.
This leadso nt ot he second problem:t he 'tyrannyo ft he tactical'. The NSC offerss enior politicians( who arenaturally preoccupiedwith the short term) muchh ands-on control. Indeed, Cameron has spokena bout the need fora ction and implementation over longer-term planning within the NSC context. 11 Advances in real-time communications have given hima nd his colleaguesa tt he senior levelm uch greaters ay over thet actical aspects of covert action, inter alia,t han ever before.Y et tactical developmentsn eed to be properly balanced with am ore strategic and long-term appraisal. 12 Manyhavecriticised theNSC forfailing to achieve justthat, pointing to an absence of policy outcomes on serious security challenges from Ukrainet oS yria.A former Chiefofthe Defence Staff,General Sir David Richards, has stated that 'there is abig difference betweentalking about strategic issues [atN SC meetings] and being strategic',e specially regarding pressing issuessuch as Libya,the Middle East and Russia. 13 At hirdp roblem stems from the NSC's breadth of responsibility.I t mightn ot be appropriate or possible to consideri ns ufficientd etail potential or planned covert action in this forum because thec ouncil has to dealw ith a swathe of other security issues -broadly coveringcounter-terrorism, defence and domesticpolicy issuesasw ell. 14 Indeed, as notedb yo ne of the designers of the system, Pauline Neville-Jones-the NSC machineryi sa lready overstretched, underpoweredand lacking in the ability to followupondecisionseffectively. 15 Focusing disproportionately on emerging issueso rc rises, seniorp olicymakersand officials areunlikely to have the time to debate and scrutinisep lans forc overt action in sufficientlyr igorous detail whenf aced with myriado ther, often morep ressing,s ecurity-related issues. 16 Yet, given the importance of -a nd danger inherentt o-c overt action,d etailed scrutinyi sr equired. Thee mbarrassmentc aused by the failureo fa nS AS mission in Libyawhen an undercovert eam seeking to makec ontact with rebel leadersw as caughtand detained by local militia after noisily landing by helicoptero utside of Benghazi -offers an instructiveexample. Despitet he NSC meeting very regularly throughoutthe Libya intervention, in this instance it clearly neglected to undertake the necessaryp lanning and scrutiny. 17 Although, foro bvious reasons, precise details about contemporaryco-ordination machinerya re sparse, therei sc learly room forimprovement.
Broader conceptual factorsa lso hinderB ritish co-ordination of covert action.A st he mode of intervention alters,sotoo doesthe mannerinwhich centralc ommand and co-ordination are enacted and approval is obtained. In the US system, which has a long history of such activity, 18 special operations aren ot consideredc overt action. 19 Thet wo arev erys pecific and differentthings. Special operations arean explicitly militaryactivity,defined in Title 10 of theU SC ode. 20 Covert action,b y contrast,isanact of influence conducted only by the CIA,d efined in Title 50 of the US Code. 21 Fort he US, this means twop arallel forms of command and control. One -r elatingt oc overt action -designed in the lightofthe failures of covert action in the1970s, 22 requires an explicit presidential finding. The otherrelating to militarya ctivity -i ss ubject to al esser degree of scrutiny. In the same wayt hatt he American NSC staff wasu sed to circumvent the approvals process to provide aid to the contraso f Nicaragua in the early 1980s, the military approvals routeallows the administration to conduct covert action outside of congressional scrutiny.
Yetthis distinction has not yetbeen properlyr esolved in theU K. This has been forav ariety of reasons, including less experiencei np aramilitary special operations since the Second World War; fewerpublic inquiriesinto covert action (such as the1 975 ChurchC ommittee in the US); greaterl evels of government opacity;and alack of codified definitions. Accordingly,and unlikethe US, the UK has continued to conflatespecial operations and covert action,primarily viewing the former as part of thelatter. This lack of conceptual or definitional clarity canl ead -a nd historically hasled -tointerdepartmental tensions. Indeed, muchofBritain'spostwarexperience in covert action involved interdepartmentalb ickering between the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff aboutw ho 'owned' such activityd uring the Cold War. Once it wasd ecided that the Foreign Office would take the lead, turf wars still brokeo ut as diplomats sought to prevent(often morehawkish) military voicesf rome ncroachment and backseat driving. 23 Even today, the 'lack of military or defence staff'w ithin the co-ordinating machineryh as been criticised by Richards -ac omplaint familiar to manyo fh is Cold War predecessors. 24 Af urther,l ongstanding problem relatest ot he equally ill-defined relationship betweeni ntelligence, covert action andp olicy.I ndeed, one of the longest-running debates amongst scholars, practitionersand commentators has beenwhethercovert action is part of the intelligence process. 25 This matters because it has an impactu pon the longstanding divide betweenintelligence and policy; betweeno bjectivea political assessmenta nd political advocacy.F or the UK,c overt action is notn ecessarily somethingconducted by the intelligence community,but it is something in which intelligence,p olicy and militaryo fficials shouldplay(and historically have played) an activerole.
All of these factorsh avec reated afl uid situation thatc ould result in poorly co-ordinatedcovert action.Since 1945,B ritish approaches to covert action have periodically drifted and lacked integration into broaderstrategic policy.I ti st hereforeu seful to look to earlier attempts at interdepartmental co-ordination on covert action, on the basist hatt he pastc an raise relevant issuesa nd possibilitiesw hich mayh ave since been overlookedorforgotten.

The JAC: A Solution from the Past?
The JACw as createdi n1 964. Its origins, however, could be found in the late 1950s and the requirements to counterS oviets ubversion. Notu nlike today, this wasa ne ra of proxyw arfare, subterfuge and espionage. It wasa lso an erao fB ritish decline( albeit marked by ad esire to maintain ag lobal role) and of the proliferation of indigenous conflictsi nf ar-flung cornerso ft he globe.D emonstrating parallels with today, therewas little serious beliefina conventionalo rn uclear battle between East and West.I nstead, covert action andc ounter-subversion ('clandestine activities, whether by propaganda or by operations directedagainstcommunism or,i nt he colonies,s ubversivef ormso f nationalism' 26 )w eret he weapons du jour.I ndeed, ac omponent dedicated to 'Special Political Action',af orm of covert action,w as createdi nside SIS in the 1950sw ith the remit to act 'as the operational element in SIS fort he conduct of all clandestine subversive operations in support of overseas policy objectives'. 27 Despitethis climate, Whitehall enjoyedl ittle co-ordination across departments and made little serious effortst oi ntegratei ntelligence into planning of covert action in the early yearsofthe Cold War.
Operating at the mosts ecret and sensitivelevels within Whitehall,the JAC soughttoremedythis. The first meeting of the JACw as called at 'short notice' in early September 1964 and,f romt he outset, there were serious matters to discuss:u nresti nI ndonesia and Yemen offered the first opportunitiesf or the newi nterdepartmentalf orum to begin work. 28 Its role wasvital because,asthe JACconcluded: 29 Political developments and world conditions have led to the occurrence of conflictsi nt erritories abroad withoutt he declaration of war. This had led to requirements being placed …byHMG [Her Majesty's Government] to undertake special operations in these conflicts. In conditions short of Limited or General Wari ti sapolitical requirementf or planning and carrying outs pecial operations thatH M Governmentshould be able to denythat it wasofintentresponsiblefor ahostile act againsta nother statew ith whichi t is formally at peace.T he procedures agreed interdepartmentally forsatisfying this political requirementa re re-stated as theyform the basis forplanning and executionofall specialoperations Increasingly,t he JACf ocusedo nt hose parts of the world wheret herew as a likelihood thatt he British government would send forces but, from 1966,i t also began to consider' the planning and conduct of special operations in a" pre-emptive"s ensew heret hey mayb eu sed in lieu of intervention by British forces'.T hesed evelopments and, indeed,t heir legacy canb e consideredi nf our differentw ays: the relationship betweeni ntelligence and covert action;t he co-ordination of such activities; their management;and, finally, their scrutiny.

The Intelligence-Covert Action Relationship
In the 1960s, the JACh elped to resolve numerous problems still prevalenttoday. It enjoyedac lose workingr elationship with theJ IC and shared its chairman and secretariat, therebye nsuring that ac ommon line wasa dopteda nd that intelligence assessments were utilised effectively forplanning covert action. This solved an earlier problem, highlightedby Sir Bernard Burrows, the JIC chairman, that' it wasi ncreasingly difficult to arranget he satisfactoryp rocessing of matters which involveb oth secret intelligence and secret action'.T he JIC, Burrows lamented, appeared 'tos atisfy requirements forc urrenti ntelligence andlonger-termassessments, but it has hithertobeen preventedbytradition and its terms of reference from considering thesecret action which has often flowed from this intelligence and forw hich the intelligence is often required.' 30 Thesei ssues arer elevant in the twenty-firstcentury too. The importance of impartial intelligence wass trongly highlightedb yL ordB utleri nh is review of the Iraqi WMD fiasco. 31 Despitevarious attempts at improving intelligence assessmentand dissemination since then, problems regarding covert action remain -t he boundaries betweeni ntelligence andp olicy executiona re arguably more blurred than ever before.I nas ense this is no badt hing: at the point where intelligence and policy merget herei s bound to be aconvergenceofr oles. Yet amodern-dayJAC would provide instant reliefofanotherkind. It would provide a forum fort he discussion of the specific issue at hand, basedo nt he idealo f collectived ecision-making, of turning intelligence assessments and policy planning into action. As noted earlier,this is difficult in the current systembecause of theabsenceofsuch asubject-specific forum: the NSC and its official machinery arerelatively broadactors.

Co-ordination
JACm embership comprised officials from both the intelligence community and policy departments. Its remit was 'toc o-ordinate interdepartmentalp lans forc landestine operations in areaso r situations overseasi nw hich there is or is likely to be interventionb yU nited Kingdom forces'. 32 This wasi mportant becausei tr epresentedg rowingl iaison betweenS IS and the military -i no ther words, 'jointery'-i nas ystemi nw hich the civilians had long held primacy.I n the absence of aUS-style 'Title 50 vs Title 10' debate and an explicit legal basis for command of covert action,co-ordination wasn ecessaryt os oothe potential tensions.
Covert action in this period was the preserve of individual departments: it was, in effect, decentralised. SIS undertookm uch covert action;b ut the creation and dissemination of unattributable propaganda was conducted by another actor,t he InformationResearchDepartmentinthe Foreign Office (until its disbandment in 1977). Meanwhile, deception operations, which in practice were often connected to covert action,w ereo verseen by the military's Directorate of ForwardP lans. SIS, from the late 1950s, alsob egan to work increasinglyc losely withs pecial forces in what theyc alled 'deniable operations'; 33 and the armedf orces maintaineda ni nteresti nc overt action more broadly given thatB ritainw as, as theys aw it, fighting aC old War. 34 Meanwhile, the anti-colonial natureo f manyinsurgent threats during the period allowedt he Colonial Office to claima n interest too. Bilaterall inksm ay have existeda cross departments, butt here wasl ittle effort to act strategically or to be mores ystematic in pursuing ac ross-Whitehall approach.
Such decentralisation remainst he case today. GCHQ has since acquired a role in online effects-based operations and so needs to properly co-ordinate with SIS,the Foreign Office,the Ministry of Defence and special forces. Multiple actors, often with diverging visions and goals, requireg reaterc o-ordination. This wasi mportanti nt he 1960s but is vital today. On this count, the creation of the NSC machineryw as ap ositive stepa nd goes some wayt owards achieving such co-ordination, echoing the interdepartmentala pproach of the JAC. As noted above however, the currents ysteml acksc o-ordination in terms of deliverya nd follow-up. This is especiallycrucial regarding covert action, the scope of which cane asilyd evelop incrementally.

Management
The JACalso had amanagerial function. Over its first fewm onths it discussed not onlys pecific operational matters, but also issueso fm anagement.T his allowedthe mostsenior peopleinvolved in such matters to be briefedonongoing operations. Fori nstance,o ne of the committee'sfi rstt asksw as to consider ap aper on the role of the intelligence community in covert action,w ith a particular focus on howt he setting of requirements, planning and the conduct of operations should proceed. Through the JAC, senior officials and the Chiefs of Staff Committee were kept abreast of plansf or covert action.J usta s importantly,the JACwas used to educate ministers through the circulation of its papers. 35 Policy-making canb eamessy process; the opacity of secret policy only makes it moreso. Covert action is a controversial (and potentially seductive) tool, and an option mostoftendiscussed in the contexto fs erioust hreats to a state's interests-oftenrenderingdebate over proposalsa nd counter-proposals emotive, personal and polemici n nature. The JACprovided auseful forum fort hesed iscussions.M anaging heated debates, often betweent he military and the diplomats, or betweenl ocal and Whitehall civil servants, the JAC allowedgoals and boundariestobeset. It providedaninterdepartmentalforum, workingo nt he principle of collective responsibility,f or the discussion of the extent to which operations would be offensiveo rd efensive; reactive or proactive. These competing ideas, requirements and priorities have to be balanced.
The absence of adequate managementc reates twop roblems. The first is gridlock,i nw hich nothing is achievedand proposals arecaughtupin Whitehall infighting to the detrimento f British interests. The second problem is equally detrimental: drift and malaise. These create ad hoc, disconnected and ill-considered covert action or,e ven worse, circumstancesi nw hich nobody knows whati sg oing on. Whitehall has long suffered intermittent periods of drift.Inthe late 1940s, forinstance,k ey officials scrambledt od ecipher exactly whatt heyw erea uthorisedt od o; and prior to the creation of the JACi nt he mid-1960s, the lack of co-ordination severely hinderedcounter-subversion in Yemen and Indonesia whereBritainwas using bribery, unattributable propaganda, mine-layinga nd SASa mbushes to covertlyc ounterP residents Nassera nd Sukarno,respectively. 36 This is allt he morep roblematic given thatthe inherent secrecy of covert action raisest he risk thati to perates in its ownisolatedrealm. Thisisdangerous. Disconnection from overt policy is a common cause of covert-actionf ailure. It mustb ea na djunct,a lbeit as ecret one, to broaderp olitical or military strategy.H ow this is besta chieved is subject to debate.I ndeed, betweent he late 1940s and 1960s, Whitehall regularly debated' horizontal' versus 'vertical' approachest oc overt action. 37 TheJ AC typified the former in that it wasa n interdepartmentalc ommittee;w hereas the lattera llowedc overt action to be overseen by the sponsoringdepartment (overwhelmingly the Foreign Office)i n order to betteri ntegratec overt action into the existing policy-making structures and ensureflexibility and speed.

Scrutiny
Covert action is undeniablyarisky meanso fe xecutings tate policy. Plausible deniability providesn umerous benefits, including the potential fora lightf ootprint; but should sponsorship become known, covert action could do a greatdeal of damagetothe country(or government) in question. It is therefore vital that, if undertaken, covert action is properlys crutinised,i nvolving full consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of an operation alongside its viability,t he risk involved and potential fallout or blowback.M oreover, covert action mustb ec onnectedt ob roader strategic thinking,therebypreventing an ad hoc (and ill-considered) approach and the dangersofseparateor'rogue' foreign policies. Another keyq uestion in this regard is legal scrutiny:t he JACd id not coverthis aspect in its considerations, but questions of legality have certainly been afforded am orep rominentp osition in recenty ears, includingw ithin the NSC, which is attended by the attorneygeneral as necessary. 38 Anyr eincarnationo ft he JACw ould therefore have to take this elementinto account.
The utility of the JAClay in the fact thatitbroughttogether the intelligence and policyc ommunities to scrutinise proposals. In conjunction with the intelligence community,t he JACh elped to determine whether covert action wasw ortht he inevitable risksa nd whetheri tw ould meet its goals. To achieve the latter, an assessmento f the balance of poweri nt he respective conflict is necessary.W ould aiding a particular rebel group, fore xample, actuallym akead ifference?W ould it win regardless? Would covert support be futileb ecause ther ebel grouph as no chance? Moreover, the JAC, in conjunction with intelligence officials, scrutinisedt he intended recipiento f such covert support.C oreq uestions includedt he group'st rustworthiness, openness to counter-bribery,r esolve to win and linksw ith terror networks. Unintended consequences were also considered. Plannersofcovert action and the intelligence community assessed the risksofescalation, mission creep, dangers of potential blowbacka nd the impact of an operation becoming public. 39 This again demonstrates thei mportance of close relations betweenintelligenceand the planning of covert action. Finally,the JACa lso provideda ni mportantc hannel betweenintelligence, military and policy planners, and senior ministers;discussion and approval were two-way processes.
The sameq uestions were likely asked priort oi ntervention in Libya in 2011 and whend ebatingS yria in 2013 anda gain in 2015,e specially given failureo nt he parto ft he US to create av etted armed rebel group. The Syrian oppositioni sd eeplyf ragmenteda nd complex,encompassing linkstoavariety of extremista nd terrorist networks.
Cameron has spoken of 70,000 moderate fighters in Syria, 40 butmachineryakin to that of the JACisvital in determining who these mayb ea nd howb estt op rovide covert support.W ith fluid threats and ever-changing non-state actors, these questions areasimportantasever. They area lso perhaps even more difficult to answer.
The risk of covert action becoming public is also nowg reatert han ever. More actorst end to be involved today (increasing the risk of leaks), while the digital erac hallenges the ability of governments to keep secrets. 41 It is thereforep articularly importantf or plannerst oc onsidert he consequences of covert action suddenlyb ecoming overt, as happened in Libyain2011. This needs to be donef romt he perspective of the domestic population (covert action causesless damage, if leaked, whenitis compatiblew ith public opinion)a sw ell as of thet argetp opulation and other states with an interest in the countryi n question, both of which could react in ah ostilem anner.I ndeed, international opinion is arguably becoming less toleranto fW estern action,c overt or otherwise. 42 Scrutiny,t herefore, is essential in today'sworld.

Conclusions
From the 1970st he JACf ell into abeyance: the short-lived conflicts which it had been createdt ot ackle had been resolved. Despiteab riefr esurrection in thee arly 1980s, it had peteredo ut altogether by the end of the ColdW ar. 43 Thereafter, the secrecy in which the JAC had operated ensured that its lessons -a nd even itse xistence -w erel ostt o history.Indeed, the systemofthe 1990s and 2000sw as somewhat' opaque', markedb yal ack of clarity aboutt he decision-makingprocesses underpinning policydecisions. 44 TheN SC,a nd its attendant machinery, is perhaps the closest mechanism Whitehall currently has to the JAC. The purpose of both is to ensure interdepartmentalc o-ordination. The JACs ervedt ot emper more aggressive or ambitious proposals in its day, while the NSC achieved somethings imilari n relation to the Libya intervention. 45 However, moreattention is needed specifically on covert action -especially in the currentclimate in whichdeniable interventioni st emptingy et risky.A n important instrument in as tate's policy toolkit, covert action offersc ertain benefits and should not automatically be discounted. It is, however, an inherently risky and emotiveo ption. Proper co-ordination and management of such activity is therefore vital,e specially because certain tensions in the British systemh aven ot yetb een resolved, owing to history,p olitical culturea nd bureaucracy.U nlikem osto ther policy tools, it is ap ractice thatc onsistently escapes critique, whetherbyacademics, journalists or policy-makers.T his is for obvious reasons; but its secrecy does not absolvethe needfor debate or attempts to learn from the past. The JACisjustone example of whereananswer-f ound in the past-has subsequently been lostto the mists of time. 