‘States not Governments’: Reforming Britain’s practice on Diplomatic Recognition, 1973-80

SummaryThe subject of recognition is basic to the way in which relations are conducted between states: they cannot easily communicate if they do not recognize one another’s existence. The question is also a difficult one in international law because, in practice, governments often adopt a pragmatic approach when specific instances of recognition arise. One important difference in practice was between countries — including Britain until 1980 — that extended recognition to particular governments and those that focused simply on the recognition of states. However, in April 1980, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, announced a change in practice, so that London would ‘recognize States in accordance with common international doctrine’. This announcement followed years of discussion within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a discussion that was influenced by complex legal considerations over recognition and by membership of the European Community. This article investigates how and why such a change in British practice on recognition came about, showing that the British also gave consideration to a compromise solution, which would have involved tacit recognition of new governments, short of dispensing with such recognition altogether.

However, on 28 April 1980 one of Brown's successors, Lord Carrington, announced a fundamental change in British practice. Based on a review first announced to parliament soon after Margaret Thatcher's government took office, 'we have decided that we shall no longer accord recognition to Governments.' Henceforth, the British would 'recognise States in accordance with common international doctrine.' 3 This reform followed several years of discussion within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), a discussion which was influenced by particular problems over recognition and by membership of the European Community (EC), most of whose members already recognised 'states not governments'. This article investigates how and why such a change in British practice came about.

British Practice before 1973
The British criteria for recognition, both before and after Carrington's announcement, revolved not around moral questions like human rights or respect for liberal values, but around practical questions about who held effective power in a particular state.
Hence, in Brown's 1967 statement, emphasis was laid upon three factors: 'effective control' of territory, the 'obedience of the mass of the population' and the assurance of a 'reasonable prospect of permanence' fro the regime. In essence, London wanted to know whom it should deal with on such everyday, practical questions as commercial exchanges, debt repayment, legal obligations and the protection of British citizens. Under pre-1980 practice, it was certainly not necessary to renew recognition with every change of government, so long as these changes were made in a constitutional fashion. However, unconstitutional changes, such as those brought about by the overthrow of a monarchy or by a military coup (the latter an increasing problem in the 1960s), did call for a decision on whether to conduct business with the new regime. Notwithstanding the complex debate surrounding such cases, the way recognition was given effect was surprisingly simple: there was no ceremony or special document; London simply began to conduct normal diplomatic correspondence with whatever authority it recognised. In most cases, there was little debate about who to recognise, because there was little debate about who held power.
This was so even when the British could have little liking for the change of government. Thus, in early 1966 London quickly decided to maintain relations with the military government of Nigeria, which had just ousted the Commonwealth country's post-independence civilian government in a particularly violent coup. 4 But there were cases when a decision was not so swift.
Sometimes there was room for debate over the fundamental question of whether a change of leadership was indeed 'unconstitutional'. When the military seized power in Greece in April 1967, for example, the question of recognition was posed, but most Western countries continued to deal with Athens because the head of state, King Constantine, remained in place. Here, the fact that Greece was a fellow member of NATO undoubtedly influenced the decision to work with the Colonels who had seized power; in any case, whatever the popular concern that events aroused in Britain, the junta clearly had control of the country's territory and population. 5 Constantine's banishment in December 1967 led to a much more prolonged debate over the issue of recognition. But, again, there was soon no doubt that the Colonels controlled Greece and, barely a month later, London decided 'to resume doing business' with them. 6 In other instances, there was a prolonged period of doubt about whether a new regime had a secure hold over its territory and population. This was especially true in cases where a civil war broke out. For example, when Imam Mohammed Al-Badr of the Yemen was overthrown in 1962, London refused to recognise the new republican regime because, while it apparently commanded the obedience of most of the population, Al-Badr himself escaped and began a counterinsurgency. 7 Sometimes the debate surrounding a decision could become very complex. When Bangladesh, with Indian military support, declared its independence from Pakistan in 1971-2 there was soon little doubt that the new government had firm control of its territory and the obedience of its population. However, London was reluctant to offend the Pakistan, a Commonwealth member and close ally of the United States. Recognition of the new state was delayed for several weeks, until well after the FCO's usual criteria for recognition had been fulfilled. 8 Clearly, albeit to a limited extent, recognition might be used as a political weapon, to express approval or disapproval of a new regime, and perhaps to influence its policies. But in most cases the United Kingdom did not let ideological or moral questions affect recognition. In May 1975, for example, there was hardly any debate about recognising the extremist Khmer Rouge government in Cambodia, which had toppled the pro-Western Lon Nol. 9 Nonetheless, 'normal' practice often had its exceptions. During the post-war period, the Cold War had a particular impact on British behaviour. London did not recognise such Communist regimes as East Germany, North Korea and North Vietnam in the 1960s even though they had firm control over a precisely-defined territory. These three cases involved recognition not of a government of course, but of a state that claimed to have an independent existence, and in all three instances there was another, pro-Western state (respectively, West Germany, South Korea and South Vietnam) that claimed to be the sole legitimate government of the contested territory. This raised complex legal issues and London would have been unusual indeed if it had broken ranks with the rest of the Western alliance and recognised any of these 'states'. However, Britain entered into diplomatic relations with North Vietnam and East Germany in 1973-4, helped by the end of the Vietnam War in the first case and by progress on East-West détente in the second. It did so with the approval of the US, West Germany and other allies, a point that shows how the behaviour of other states might influence British thinking.
Another regular consideration in British policy was the well-being of the Commonwealth, which faced numerous changes of regime in member states by the 1960s. Significantly, a 1967 Commonwealth Office memorandum noted that Britain 'consistently sought to avoid the formal recognition of new regimes after coups in Commonwealth states', for a number of reasons. London did not want to seem to condone illegality, to back a particular political faction or to appear to interfere in domestic matters; above all, it wanted 'to avoid too pointedly the charge… of having neo-colonialist or otherwise hostile motives.' For the moment, London escaped such difficulties by waiting to see what other Commonwealth (or, in Africa, African) states did in recognising new regimes. The memorandum made no mention of a 'states not governments' approach as an alternative way out of the problem. 10 Of course, by the early 1970s British diplomats were well aware that many other governments followed the practice of recognising 'states not governments.' There was one powerful reason why this approach was increasingly adopted. It was felt, especially in the Third World, that recognition of particular governments was an insulting practice that smacked of interference in a country's internal affairs. It amounted to 'neo-colonialist' behaviour. Latin Americans led the way, following Mexico's adoption of the so-called 'Estrada Doctrine' (named after its foreign minister) in 1931, largely because they resented American meddling in domestic politics throughout the Western Hemisphere. But FCO legal experts 11 were strongly opposed to adopting the 'states not governments' approach and could be quite caustic about it. In February 1972 one of them, Sir Vincent Evans, claimed that he had yet to hear 'any coherent explanation' of it and that, 'despite its superficial attraction' it could not solve what he called 'the problem of recognition…' While agreeing the proposition that 'each State's choice of Government is an internal domestic matter' he argued that this principle, in itself, did not help other States to identify who really held power. The question was an important one, legally and politically, because recognised governments had significant rights in the international sphere. They could sign treaties, obtain diplomatic immunities for their representatives and claim immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign courts. In most cases, the decision on recognition after a coup was easy enough but, where a 'claimant appears insecure or there are rival claimants, the problem is more difficult…' and there was a need for certain criteria to be used in helping a decision, such as those Britain used. For Evans, recognition of 'states not governments' was 'no more than the adoption of a practice which studiously avoid formal acts of recognition whenever possible, relying instead on recognition by implication.' 12 The FCO lawyers became tenacious opponents of any change in British practice.

Chile, Greece and European Community membership, 1973-4
The seminal case that sparked intense debate in the FCO over the very basis of British practice on recognition was that of Chile. In September 1973 its President, Salvador Allende, was overthrown by the military under General Augusto Pinochet. The coup provoked moral outrage throughout the West. Allende may have been a Marxist but he was also democratically-elected, whereas Pinochet's regime immediately set out on a ruthless campaign to imprison or liquidate its opponents. There were numerous appeals from the British public not to recognise the new regime. 13 Of course, such appeals were based on a belief that moral questions should influence decisions on recognition. But, as seen above, British criteria for recognition were based on more mundane principles and the FCO's Latin American Department was clear that the Pinochet regime fulfilled the normal expectations. Arguments about morality, or the fact Allende was freely elected were beside the point. Pinochet now controlled the territory and its population, so he ought to be recognised, just as Britain had recognised other Latin American military regimes following recent coups in Argentina (1966), Peru (1968) and Ecuador (1972)cases in which the Press and public had shown little interest. 14 Although there was no duty under international law to recognise regimes, the British generally acted as though they were under an obligation to recognise once their criteria were met. 15 Significantly, when discussing the recognition of Pinochet's regime the FCO decided to sound out their eight partners in the EC, which the Conservative government of Edward Heath had joined at the start of the year. Most of these already took a different approach to Britain on recognition, extending this to states not particular regimes. Having adopted this approach some years before, France was especially quick to enter into normal diplomatic contacts with Pinochet, avoiding discussion about whether and when to extend recognition. Following the public outrage provoked by the Pinochet coup in Britain, the Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, wanted to know from the FCO legal advisers -in 'a very brief answer' rather than 'a long legal treatise' -whether it was possible to 'move to the French system thereby avoiding a lot of… heart searching whenever a change of regime takes place…'. 16 Of course, Vincent Evans had already made his views on the French system clear the previous February and his minute was sent to Douglas-Home by way of response. One of the Legal Counsellors, Fred Burrows, added, in a covering note, that even 'the French position is not really very different from our own' because, after any violent change of regime, Paris still had to decide who was in control of a state. 'The only difference is that the French… have decided not to call it "recognition" This may, or may not, help them to avoid answering awkward questions in the initial stages, but it does not enable them to avoid taking decisions' on recognition.' 17 Burrows clearly had little time for the French approach, yet he had touched on a key point when he wrote that the French were able, by their practice, to 'avoid answering awkward questions in the initial stages.' It was a point that seemed increasingly important to British diplomats in the field. As one pointed out: whatever the legal arguments are, the fact is that we find that the act of "recognition" attracts more attention and therefore more political difficulties than it does in other countries of NATO… I agree that changing our policy to recognition of "States" not "Government" is, in fact, when analysed, mere semantics without any practical meaning, but if it would make it easier for us to avoid a formal "Act of Recognition", why not adopt it? 18 Robin Hooper, the Ambassador to Athens, was another official who felt it worth looking at a change of practice because it seemed so much easier to avoid controversies by following the 'states not governments' approach. Hooper had recently been through another agonised debate about a constitutional change in Greece (the third since April 1967) when, in June 1973, the military junta finally abolished the Greek monarchy. This had stirred up more complaints from the Press about dealing with a dictatorship but, yet again, the junta fulfilled the British criteria for recognition. The British consulted their EC allies on the point only to find that most did not consider there was an issue of recognition. Significantly, after this EC consultation, Hooper was instructed by the FCO to 'play down the recognition aspect' in any public dealings and even to 'avoid using the word' recognition. 19 Then, in November, the junta underwent an internal coup, which led to another change of leadership. London again consulted its EC partners and again found that, because they recognised 'states not governments', the issue of recognition did not arise. Denmark alone, it seemed, shared the British approach. As an official in the Southern Europe Department noted, British policy was to recognise 'the people in power as soon as we are sure they are firmly in the saddle, whether we like them or not.' It was supposed to be a practical question about where power rested, not a moral one about their conduct. But the debate that followed any 'unconstitutional' change of regime drew attention to the fact that Britain was choosing to deal with unsavoury characters. The 'states not governments formula', by seeming to sidestep the issue of choice, 'avoids the criticisms which the British policy attracts.' 20 Such concerns led Douglas-Home to request another, fuller submission on what he called 'the French doctrine of recognition.' 21 However, despite the rising crescendo of concern from their Diplomatic Service colleagues, the FCO legal team continued to express deep scepticism about a possible change of policy, in caustic tones similar to those used by Evans. An initial response by one of the Legal Counsellors, Ian Sinclair, dismissed 'the so-called French doctrine' as 'neither coherent nor rational.' French practice after a coup was to resume diplomatic business only after the situation in a state had stabilised and it was clear who held authority.
'This is almost indistinguishable from our own practice…, the only difference being that we regard the resumption of business… as constituting an act of recognition.' Neither was it clear how the French practice helped in a situation of civil war, where two authorities claimed to be the legal government of a state. Sinclair amplified Evans' point that recognition carried with it serious legal consequences. For example, in actions before the British courts, a recognised government could claim immunity against civil proceedings and claim title to property held by its predecessors. The FCO, when requested, issued legally binding certificates to the courts, stating the date from which foreign governments were recognised. He pointed out that at least one eminent French international lawyer, Professor Charles Rousseau, was 'scornful' of the 'states not government' approach and also that United States policy, which had 'previously given much greater weight to political considerations' had moved closer to British practice in recent years. Furthermore, whatever the 'superficial' attraction of French practice, if Britain adopted it, it this would not guarantee that controversies could be avoided, because 'we would be bound in any event, if pressed, to concede… that the act of resuming diplomatic links amount to tacit recognition.' Ministers were not put off by such a quick-fire response and, in reply to Sinclair's minute, Anthony Royle, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, asked for a full report about the practice of other EC members who claimed to follow the 'states not government' formula. 22 This led to several weeks of study. The position was, to say the least, confused. For example, despite what had happened after the latest coup in Athens, when the British embassy believed the Germans followed a 'states not governments' approach, Sinclair pointed to a report by the legal adviser to Britain's Bonn embassy, which insisted that 'Germany does require to accord recognition, but it may be done informally.' Belgian practice was felt to be ambiguous, while Denmark was understood to follow British practice. 23 In contrast, the Southern European Department, which had recently had to deal with the unconstitutional changes in Greece, was confident that all the EC members other than Denmark (and including West Germany) followed a 'states not government' line.
Reporting on this, one of its members, Robert Cornish, pointed to criticism of recent British decisions on recognition in Parliament and the media. He argued that London could be 'left out on a limb' in relation to its EC partners and added his opinion that the majority practice 'makes good sense.' 24 Others took a different view. In early January 1974, a brief report about Italian and Dutch practice was produced by the FCO's Research Department, based on a number of recent case studies of recognition. Despite its factual nature, this gave weight to the legal advisers' case. For example, while both countries seemed to recognise 'states not governments', they had to wait until a situations had settled down after a coup, had to decide on the precise timing of any resumption of diplomatic business and had found that dealing with the Pinochet regime sparked bitter public controversy. 25 Sinclair felt there was clear evidence that the Italians 'do attach significance to the formal act of acknowledging a note from a new regime', while the Dutch presented 'a case where lip-service may be paid to the French doctrine but where in practice the same problems are encountered' as Britain. 26 For the moment this is where the discussion rested, no submission to the Foreign Other countries faced the same challenge, of course, and they too were shifting their practice. France had been quick off the mark with its variation of the Estrada doctrine.
But also, the United States, which had previously been quite blatant in its use of recognition almost as a political weapon, now tended to accept new regimes after a short time without making much of the formal recognition process. 27 The Debate under Labour, 1974-9.
Douglas-Home's departure did not bring any respite for the legal advisers. Instead, the Foreign Secretary of the incoming Labour administration, James Callaghan, also asked for a report on French practice. 28  Evans' views seem largely to have satisfied Labour ministers, but not Britain's diplomats. 30  where his main opponents were, with his remark that, 'I realise that our criteria for recognition may have earned a permanent place in the hearts of our lawyers…' 31 Cable initially tried to meet these arguments with a short summary of Evans' arguments, but Leahy was determined to persevere. He produced telegrams from The Hague and Bonn suggesting that the Netherlands and West Germany both recognised 'states not governments', and he accused Evans of being 'a trifle cavalier' in his dismissal of the practice. 32 This forced a rather longer riposte from Cable, together with a full copy of Evans' minute of 22 May and a request for Leahy to find out more about French practice. 33 This Leahy was quite willing to do; or rather one of his colleagues, Robin Renwick did so, calling on the Deputy Legal Adviser at the Quai d'Orsay. The latter insisted that the new French practice of recognising 'states not governments' was much better than the 'classical' one and even felt that British and French policy was growing closer together, 'as we seemed equally concerned to get away from the formal and solemn character of according recognition…' The main difference was that London still insisted on publicly confirming that recognition had occurred. As to political co-operation in the EC, 'the doctrinal differences did not matter much', as long as there was co-operation over the timing of a resumption of business with a new regime. 34 But, for Sinclair, French policy was still 'illogical' and could not deal easily with situations where two authorities claimed jurisdiction over the same territory; and he wrote to Leahy on these lines. 35 Leahy, as he recognised, was not without support among diplomats on the ground. Staff at the embassy in Addis Ababa, who had had to handle Haile Selassie's downfall, remarked in November 1974 on the fact that their EC partners seemed 'free from any pressure to make any dramatic once for all decision.' 36  It is significant that events continued to move against Britain where any debates did occur. In May 1978, for example, when the Comorian government was overthrown, the British refused to extend recognition because the new regime was installed by white mercenaries and lacked popular obedience, but even Denmark now seemed to have adopted the 'states not governments' approach and Britain was increasingly isolated within the European Community on such questions. 38 Nonetheless, the FCO legal advisers stuck doggedly to their established line. In 1978, when debate raged over the possible recognition of Namibia, Sir Ian Sinclair wrote that British policy had 'very considerable long-term advantages' because it was based upon 'more or less objective criteria' rather than upon political bias. 39

Reform under Thatcher stalls, June-September 1979
The announcement of a full-scale review of British practice was made by Ian The following day, steps began within the Office to carry out the review, with ministers agreeing that Gilmour should lead it. Typically, when Sinclair was asked to comment on the review, he continued to put the same arguments that had been used against the 'states not governments' formula for years. The actual difference between Britain and its EC partners was, he said, 'pretty minimal' and the British criteria were not 'purely legal arguments' but 'serve an important political objectivenamely that of securing consistency in our approach to recognition problems…' 41 Yet, professional diplomats were still not convinced by the legal advisers' approach. Two officials scribbled impatiently on Sinclair's minute, one complaining, 'But our doctrine makes it less easy to fudge a decision', the other pointing out that successive Foreign Secretaries saw problems with existing British practice, seeing it as 'unworkable.' 42 In any case, Gilmour was not dissuaded from carrying out a review and he expressed doubts about Sinclair's view that differences with the EC were 'pretty minimal'. The review was put in the hands of the FCO's Planning Staff, which was asked to make comparisons to EC and US practice, and to look at any 'anomalies' in British policy. 43 The Planning Staff were at work by the end of June, gathering evidence, reading various earlier memoranda and consulting closely with Sinclair. Meanwhile, on 3 July, in reply to another question from Aitken, the Prime Minister herself said she was 'prepared to consider the criteria for recognition. There was considerable concern about the recognition of Ghana. The recognition was made just a few hours before all those terrible executions which I have continued totally and utterly to condemn.' 44 By mid-July a draft paper was ready. This emphasised that the existing recognition criteria had the advantages of being objective, internally consistent and providing legal certainty about those who, in British eyes, legally held power in a foreign country. The disadvantages were that the public often believed recognition signified moral approval of a regime, that Britain sometimes felt obliged to extend recognition when delay would be politically more prudent, and that it was difficult to reach a common position with the rest of the EC. In contrast, a system that avoided express talk of 'recognition', would make it easier to avoid public controversy, yet a choice still had to be made about when to begin dealing with a new regime and this might continue to provoke criticism. In conclusion, the paper rejected the option of recognising states, arguing that this would mark 'a considerable break with British tradition.' Instead, it came up with a compromise. London would continue to recognise governments but, so as to minimise the danger of public controversy, it would 'do business with a new government abroad without taking a public position on the issue of recognition.' 45 Few in the FCO welcomed the draft paper's recommendation. The News Department, rather than seeing the proposed change in policy as likely to make its job easier, feared journalists would simply alter their line of questioning, asking 'Has HM Representative yet done business with the new regime?' The suggested reform would also make decisions seem secretive and subject, perhaps, to moral judgements; it was better, therefore, to leave the current system alone. 46  as why the French should have more trouble than Britain in deciding which side to recognise in a civil war. 49 Another violent change of regime, the overthrow of President Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua by the Sandinista movement, created more momentum for change. At first, Thatcher, rather than formally extending recognition to the new regime, hoped simply to 'establish contact' with it, as the French and others intended to do. The FCO felt that they had to grant recognition according to existing policy and Thatcher allowed herself to be persuaded of this, but the episode again suggested that Downing Street wanted a change of practice. 50 Gilmour, meanwhile, minuted on 31 July, 'I remain convinced that change is desirable, but I think we can let events take their course.' 51 However, as responses came in from European posts to the Planning Staff's enquiries, about recognition, it was clear that there were more differences around Europe on recognition than British diplomats hitherto believed and this gave ammunition to the lawyers. The Italians followed French practice and the only serious recent problem with this concerned Pinochet's coup in Chile, which had aroused the ire of the Left. In practice, when deciding the point at which to do business with a new regime, Italy used criteria similar to London's (such as whether a new regime controlled a territory and its population) but it also put special emphasis on the need to achieve EC joint action. 52 Belgium, too, as had long been understood, was close to French practice. 53 Ireland, with a few exceptions, such as when it entered into relations with Communist China in 1972, followed the 'states not governments' formula. 54 But the West Germans operated more elastic system than France and agreed with Britain that a decision had to be made on when to deal with a new regime.
Whereas the Germans expressly recognised new states, they avoided any public talk of recognising governments. 55 Only the Dutch, who had previously been seen as following the 'states not government' formula, seemed to operate a system close to Britain's and shared Sinclair's disparagement of the French. 56 Then again, Denmark, while it had tried to move to a 'states not governments' approach, still had much in common with British practice when it came to doing business with new regimes and was marked by 'deliberate obfuscation.' 57 Significantly, the French agreed that their own policy was not flawless (as when there were two claimants to power) and that there was a need to decide when to renew contacts after a violent change of regime (in which case they used criteria similar to London's). But they felt their system worked well in most cases, that there was little questioning from Press and Parliament, and that no serious legal complications arose, even though the Courts sometimes acted without guidance from the French government in deciding who held authority in another state. 58 By late August 1979, in light of the views from within the FCO and of the responses from European posts, the Planning Staff had substantially redrafted their earlier memorandum and now made a different policy recommendation, which brought it 'more closely into line with the French formula.' Britain 'should retain our present criteria for deciding whether to enter into diplomatic relations with a new government' but 'should also play down the importance attached to the word "recognition" by declaring that we will in future "formally recognise states not governments".' 59 However, this suggestion still did not win universal support. The News Department, while it would not stand in the way of the reform, still preferred to stay with existing policy, though it also wanted to launch a public campaign to explain that recognition of a regime did not signify moral approval of it. The Press might 'poke fun at the sophistry of distinguishing between formal and informal recognition.' 60 More predictable was the opposition from Sinclair, who also wanted to stand by the status quo. He argued that, 'The proposed changes are entirely cosmetic and would… [expose] us to charges of hypocrisy and evasion.' 61 In reporting to the PUS, Braithwaite was almost despairing in the face of the continuing disagreements. He still personally felt that the French approach was the 'most convenient politically', but 'it is no more than a piece of obfuscation' and 'almost everybody holds strong and contradictory opinions about it.' 62 The sense of despair perhaps explain why, at another meeting between Palliser and the Deputy Under-Secretaries, it was decided to revise the Planning Staff paper so that it set out the advantages and disadvantages of British and French practice, without any recommendation on reform. This was submitted to Gilmour on 25 September, with a covering note from Palliser in which he was, 'on balance, in favour of sticking with our present doctrine, while improving our management of it.' He argued this for a number of reasons. First, given the nature of the British Press and Parliament, he believed they would continue to be interested in knowing the precise point at which Britain entered into relations with a new regime. 'When we enter into relations with an unpleasant regime, our critics object not to "recognition" as such, but to our having any dealings at all with thugs, fanatics, or other undesirables.' Secondly, he doubted that common EC action would 'shield us from criticism' since, 'Previous attempts to co-ordinate the dealings of the Nine with new regimes have foundered because of tacit competition amongst the Europeans, each anxious to extract the maximum credit for itself.' Finally, Palliser believed that it would be possible to manage the existing system better by improved public presentation, 'playing down the loaded word "recognition"' and being more flexible over the timing of first dealings with a new regime. 63

Reform Achieved, October 1979-April 1980
Gilmour did not reply to Palliser for three weeks but, when he did so, his dissatisfaction with the situation was clear. He not only argued that 'our present practice occasionally leads to considerable embarrassment', but also that French practice 'works well and is followed by most of our Community partners with success' and he believed that Parliament would accept the change. 64  Around the same time that this position was established, FCO ministers decided, in a meeting whose record has not survived, that they 'would now take steps to change… policy on Recognition.' Gilmour discussed this with Palliser and Sinclair and, on 11 January, the Lord Privy Seal requested that a parliamentary statement be prepared in the form of an 'inspired' question from a friendly MP, with a ministerial answer. The answer 'should concentrate on the thesis that the Government had examined the question carefully and had decided that the time had come for a change in policy.' It should draw attention to the problems with existing policy and 'conclude that we had decided to move closer to the position of a number of friendly countries whose policy was to recognise States not Governments.' 69 The task of drafting the question and answer did not prove easy. In making a first attempt, Sinclair was typically cautious. Anxious to avoid giving any 'hostages to fortune' on Cambodia, Afghanistan or other potential issues, he produced a carefullyworded ministerial statement. This said, among other points, that British practice was already 'broadly followed' by its EC partners and that, in moving away from the formal recognition of governments, the FCO 'do not intend to modify our practice by departing from the application of our basic criteria' on recognition. The tone of the draft suggested that current policy was not so much flawed as misunderstood.
Furthermore, for the sake of clarity in British courts, Sinclair wanted to be clear 'as to whether we "recognised" an entity as a Government on a particular date.' 70 The Planning Staff felt this last point made for 'a weak conclusion' to the draft statement, but the most Sinclair would offer was to re-order his sentences and the Planning Staff accepted this. 71 Yet again, it was left to ministers to press a more purposeful approach.
When the Foreign Secretary saw the draft answer, he was very disappointed.
He complained that it read 'more like an FCO minute than a statement for Parliament and the public'; and he wanted to bring out 'the essential point, namely that our present policy… leads to embarrassing decisions.' 72 Gilmour then made revisions to Sinclair's document, acknowledging that existing policy had sometimes 'aroused criticism and been interpreted, despite explanations to the contrary, as implying approval or disapproval', which created controversies that 'it is in our interests to avoid.' 73  would move towards the practice of 'our partners, which leaves the question of whether or not we acknowledge new regimes to be inferred from the nature of our dealings with them, instead of making a formal announcement of "recognition".' Thatcher quickly gave her approval and Carrington then issued his statement. 76 Several years of fiercely contested debate had finally come to an end.

Conclusion
It is clear that the decision to change Britain's long-standing practice, and recognise 'states not governments', was less dramatic than it appeared. As Colin Warbrick has noted, London continued to enter into dealings with regimes that came to power unconstitutionally only in the light of their ability to maintain effective control of a territory and population. 'On the face of the statement, not much [had] changed.' 77 Carrington declared, 'we shall continue to decide the nature of our dealings with regimes which come to power unconstitutionally in the light of our assessment of whether they are able of themselves to exercise effective control of the territory of the state concerned, and seem likely to do so.' 78 While this said nothing about having the loyalty of most of the population, it was very close to Britain's previous practice regarding the recognition of governments. An internal FCO memorandum acknowledged that, 'practical questions of deciding what dealings to have with a new government will remain much the same whether or not we "recognise" it' and it recommended that past precedents in British practice would continue to be 'instructive'. 79 Nor did the change in practice affect any of the existing cases where London either refused to recognise the existence of a state (such as North Korea) or to deal with a particular regime (such as Cambodia or Afghanistan). 80 Yet it would be wrong to brush the reform off as a distinction without a difference. The difference resided in the ability of the British government to deal with other States on a practical basis, free of the public outcry that followed the recognition of an Allende or a Rawlings. As Carrington explained, past practice of formally 'recognising' a new government had 'sometimes been misunderstood and… interpreted as meaning approval.' 81 Also, there was immediate evidence that the new policy worked well in the sense of minimising chances for British embarrassment.
Just before Carrington's statement, there was a military coup in Liberia, led by Sergeant Samuel Doe, with a bloody aftermath strikingly similar to that in Ghana the previous year. However, the British maintained relations with Liberia without any announcement on recognition. When a military takeover occured in Bolivia in July, London continued to act as though nothing had happened and, in September, when there was a coup in Turkey, the EC acted together to express concern, but without withdrawing their ambassadors. 82 The FCO took time to draft some detailed, practical advice to its posts on how to interpret the new policy when an unconstitutional change of regime occurred. 83 But there were soon signs that diplomats were grateful for reform. Reflecting on events in Liberia, the FCO's West African Department felt the new policy was 'of great value to us'. For example, it allowed the embassy in Monrovia to take up cases of harassment of British citizens at an early date, whereas the previous policy might have made such dealings difficult. 84 Britain's High Commissioner in Guyana, who lived through a coup in August 1980, found the new policy, as expressed in Gilmour's Commons statement, to be 'perfectly clear' and helpful. 85 Not everyone was happy.
One MP, Stephen Dorrell, complained that adopting 'continental practice… helps us not at all', because it did not solve the problem of who to deal with in Cambodia. But, it was pointed out to him that circumstances of 'competing regimes', as in Cambodia, were comparatively rare; the new policy was a real improvement in case where 'a regime comes unconstitutionally to power and attracts public repugnance in the UK.' 86 Sinclair remained concerned about the question of British courts forming a judgement on who exactly was, or was not, recognised. But this concern was met by his own insistence that any document 'dealing with the interpretation of the new policy or with any other question which may arise in implementing it', must be seen in draft form and approved by the legal advisers. 87 When, some weeks after the change in policy, a query came thorough from the Indian government about why Britain had decided on reform, an official from the FCO's South Asian Department decided to sound out the Planning Staff. From them she learnt that 'the change in our policy was a messy business stretching over several months and as many files.' It 'was also the subject of a great deal of opposition from officials, notably several of the Legal Advisers.' 88 Anyone reading the relevant documents is likely to echo these thoughts. It certainly had been a long, drawn out and divisive affair but, arguably, for good reasons. There was certainly hard evidence in favour of the legal experts' doubts about change in the early 1970s. For one thing, there was genuine confusion over what the policy of individual EC members was on recognition. While Paris almost instantly entered into dealings with Pinochet's regime in 1973, Belgium and Germany took longer to do so, while in Italy there was considerable heart-searching partly because, as in Britain, there was popular revulsion over the ousting of an elected President. 89 Nonetheless, Britain was undoubtedly in a minority position and most EC members had similar policies to France whose approach, was well suited to a world where colonial empires were in retreat, even if it had problems where civil wars made it difficult to tell who held effective power. Even as late as September 1979, the debate seemed finely balanced, but Gilmour in particular was prepared to use his authority to insist on reform. The reform had its limits. In particular, the criteria on which Britain decided to deal with any new regime, remained largely the same. But in future, by avoiding a formal announcement of such decisions, the government might neatly avoid public debate over them.