All Outputs (29)

Presentism and representation: saying it without words (2023)
Journal Article
Baron, S., Miller, K., & Tallant, J. (2023). Presentism and representation: saying it without words. Synthese, 201(2), Article 36. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03987-2

The Triviality Argument against presentism maintains that we should reject presentism because there is no way to define the view that is not either trivially true or obviously false. We suggest that this style of argument over-emphasises purely lingu... Read More about Presentism and representation: saying it without words.

Trusting What Ought to Happen (2022)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2022). Trusting What Ought to Happen. Erkenntnis, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00608-9

This paper introduces a new account of trust and distrust. The core aim of the paper is to introduce an account of trust that places treats trust and what ‘ought’ to happen as close conceptual companions. Over the course of the paper, I develop the a... Read More about Trusting What Ought to Happen.

A Defence of Lucretian Presentism (2020)
Journal Article
Tallant, J., & Ingram, D. (2020). A Defence of Lucretian Presentism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(4), 675-690. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1697709

© 2019 Australasian Journal of Philosophy. In this paper, we defend Lucretian Presentism (‘Lucretianism’). Although the view faces many objections and has proven unpopular with presentists, we rehabilitate Lucretianism and argue that none of the obje... Read More about A Defence of Lucretian Presentism.

Might Teaching Be Judgement Dependent? (2019)
Journal Article
Tallant, J., & Fisher, A. (2020). Might Teaching Be Judgement Dependent?. Philosophia, 48, 777–787. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00130-3

Our thesis in this paper is that consideration of Wright’s account of what it is to be judgement-dependent leads us to the conclusion that teaching is judgement dependent. We begin with a consideration of Wright’s account of what it is to be judgemen... Read More about Might Teaching Be Judgement Dependent?.

Grounding at a distance (2019)
Journal Article
Baron, S., Miller, K., & Tallant, J. (2019). Grounding at a distance. Philosophical Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01374-1

What distinguishes causation from grounding? One suggestion is that causation, but not grounding, occurs over time. Recently, however, counterexamples to this simple temporal criterion have been offered. In this paper, we situate the temporal criteri... Read More about Grounding at a distance.

Trust in education (2019)
Journal Article
Fisher, A., & Tallant, J. (2019). Trust in education. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 52(7), 780-790. https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2019.1692304

The philosophy of trust is a relatively small subfield. Nonetheless, it contains within it many important insights. Our contention in this paper is that careful study of this subfield can bring with it many insights that can and should be used to rec... Read More about Trust in education.

Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World (2019)
Journal Article
Baron, S., Miller, K., & Tallant, J. (2021). Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 102(2), 281-301. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12637

Current debate in the metaphysics of time ordinarily assumes that we should be realists about time. Recently, however, a number of physicists and philosophers of physics have proposed that time will play no role in a completed theory of quantum gravi... Read More about Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World.

Presentism and the spans of time (2019)
Journal Article
Tallant, J., & Ingram, D. (2020). Presentism and the spans of time. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 101(1), 200-214. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12590

Trust: from the Philosophical to the Commercial (2019)
Journal Article
Tallant, J., & Donati, D. (2020). Trust: from the Philosophical to the Commercial. Philosophy of Management, 19(1), 3-19. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40926-019-00107-y

© 2019, The Author(s). This is a paper about trust, with a specific focus on the ways in which trust is investigated in the business literature and the commercial sector. The lens through which the topic is approached is distinctively philosophical.... Read More about Trust: from the Philosophical to the Commercial.

You can trust the ladder, but you shouldn’t (2019)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2019). You can trust the ladder, but you shouldn’t. Theoria, 85(2), 102-118. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12177

My claim in this paper is that, contra what I take to be the orthodoxy in the wider literature, we do trust inanimate objects—per the example in the title, there are cases where people really do trust a ladder (to hold their weight, for instance), an... Read More about You can trust the ladder, but you shouldn’t.

It's one thing to rule them all and another thing to bind them (2018)
Journal Article
Tallant, J., & Baron, S. (2021). It's one thing to rule them all and another thing to bind them. Synthese, 198(1), 105-115. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01983-z

In this paper we offer a response to one argument in favour of Priority Monism, what Jonathan Schaffer calls the nomic argument for monism. We proceed in three stages. We begin by introducing Jonathan Schaffer’s Priority Monism and the nomic argument... Read More about It's one thing to rule them all and another thing to bind them.

An error in temporal error theory (2018)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2018). An error in temporal error theory. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 4(1), 14-32. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2018.5

Within the philosophy of time there has been a growing interest in positions that deny the reality of time. Those positions, whether motivated by arguments from physics or metaphysics, have a shared conclusion: time is not real. What has not been mad... Read More about An error in temporal error theory.

Causation in a timeless world? (2018)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2018). Causation in a timeless world?. Inquiry, 62(3), 300-316. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1446051

This paper is an attempt to answer the question, 'could there be causation in a timeless world?' My conclusion: tentatively, yes. The paper and argument have three parts. Part one introduces salient issues and spells out the importance of this (initi... Read More about Causation in a timeless world?.

Presentism remains (2017)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2019). Presentism remains. Erkenntnis, 84(2), 409–435. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9965-4

Here I examine some recent attempts to provide a new way of thinking about the philosophy of time that question the central role of ‘presentness’ within the definition of presentism. The central concern raised by these critics turns on the intelligib... Read More about Presentism remains.

Commitment in cases of trust and distrust (2017)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2017). Commitment in cases of trust and distrust. Thought: Fordham University Quarterly, 6(4), https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.259

There is a well-developed literature on trust. Distrust, on the other hand, has gathered far less attention in the philosophical literature (though there is a burgeoning business literature on the topic). A recent exception to that trend in the philo... Read More about Commitment in cases of trust and distrust.

Presentism, persistence and trans-temporal dependence (2017)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2018). Presentism, persistence and trans-temporal dependence. Philosophical Studies, 175(9), 2209-2220. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0955-9

My central thesis is that presentism is incompatible with all of the main theories of persistence: endurance, exdurance (stage theory) and perdurance.

Truth and dependence (2017)
Journal Article
Tallant, J., & Ingram, D. (2017). Truth and dependence. ERGO, 4(33), https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.033

Temporal passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument (2016)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2016). Temporal passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument. Manuscrito, 39(4), https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045

Dynamic theories of time typically commit to the claim that “time passes”. In this paper I develop a version of the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument in order to show that time does not pass, but that this is no threat to dynamic theories of time... Read More about Temporal passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument.

Do not revise Ockham's razor without necessity (2016)
Journal Article
Baron, S., & Tallant, J. (2018). Do not revise Ockham's razor without necessity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 96(3), 596-619. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12337

Ockham’s razor asks that we not multiply entities beyond necessity. The razor is a powerful methodological tool, enabling us to articulate reasons for preferring one theory to another. There are those, however, who would modify the razor. Schaffer (2... Read More about Do not revise Ockham's razor without necessity.

Monism: the islands of plurality (2016)
Journal Article
Baron, S., & Tallant, J. (2016). Monism: the islands of plurality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93(3), 583-606. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12270

Priority monism (hereafter, ‘monism’) is the view that there exists one fundamental entity—the world—and that all other objects that exist (a set of objects typically taken to include tables, chairs, and the whole menagerie of everyday items) are mer... Read More about Monism: the islands of plurality.