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All Outputs (8)

The matter of motivating reasons (2021)
Journal Article
Cunningham, J. J. (2022). The matter of motivating reasons. Philosophical Studies, 179, 1563-1589. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01719-9

It is now standard in the literature on reasons and rationality to distinguish normative reasons from motivating reasons. Two issues have dominated philosophical theorising concerning the latter: (i) whether we should think of them as certain (nonfac... Read More about The matter of motivating reasons.

Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons (2021)
Journal Article
Cunningham, J. J. (2022). Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 105(2), 385-405. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12825

It's one thing to do the right thing. It's another to be creditable for doing the right thing. Being creditable for doing the right thing requires that one does the right thing out of a morally laudable motive and that there is a non-accidental fit b... Read More about Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons.

The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason (2018)
Journal Article
Cunningham, J. J. (2019). The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason. Philosophical Quarterly, 69(275), 235-257. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqy019

We can contrast rationalising explanations of the form S φs because p with those of the form S φs because S believes that p. According the Common Kind View, the two sorts of explanation are the same. The Disjunctive View denies this. This paper sets... Read More about The Formulation of Disjunctivism About φ-ing for a Reason.

Knowledgeably Responding to Reasons (2018)
Journal Article
Cunningham, J. (2020). Knowledgeably Responding to Reasons. Erkenntnis, 85(3), 673-692. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0043-3

Jennifer Hornsby has defended the Reasons-Knowledge Thesis (RKT): the claim that Φ -ing because p requires knowing that p, where the ‘because’ at issue is a rationalising ‘because’. She defends (RKT) by appeal to the thought that it provides the best... Read More about Knowledgeably Responding to Reasons.

Are Perceptual Reasons the Objects of Perception? (2018)
Book Chapter
Cunningham, J. J. (2018). Are Perceptual Reasons the Objects of Perception?. In J. Gersel, R. Thybo Jensen, M. S. Thaning, & S. Overgaard (Eds.), In the light of experience: New essays on perception and reasons (256-280). Oxford University Press

This paper begins with a Davidsonian puzzle in the epistemology of perception and introduces two solutions to that puzzle: the Truth-Maker View (TMV) and the Content Model. The paper goes on to elaborate (TMV), elements of which can be found in the w... Read More about Are Perceptual Reasons the Objects of Perception?.

Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition? (2017)
Journal Article
Cunningham, J. J. (2019). Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?. Synthese, 196(9), 3889-3910. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1630-6

Here is a surprisingly neglected question in contemporary epistemology: what is it for an agent to believe that p in response to a normative reason for them to believe that p? On one style of answer, believing for the normative reason that q factors... Read More about Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?.

REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM (2016)
Journal Article
Cunningham, J. (2016). REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM. Episteme, 13(1), 111-132. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.62

It is now common to distinguish Metaphysical from Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge principle will... Read More about REFLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM.