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Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal in a vertical structure with cross ownership (2024)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A., Wang, L. F., & Sun, J. (2024). Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal in a vertical structure with cross ownership. Economics Letters, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111681

We provide a new reason for Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal. In a two-tier industry with a profit-maximising input supplier and symmetric final good producers, we show that the profit reversal occurs under passive cross ownership among firms.

Cross ownership and merger under technology adoption (2024)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A. (2024). Cross ownership and merger under technology adoption. Indian Growth and Development Review, https://doi.org/10.1108/IGDR-10-2023-0162

We consider the effects of a merger on technology adoption and welfare in the presence of passive cross ownership. Merger increases investments in process technology and may increase welfare. Our results are important for antitrust policies and sugge... Read More about Cross ownership and merger under technology adoption.

Downstream cross-holdings and upstream R&D: A comment (2024)
Journal Article
Jin, Y., Mukherjee, A., & Zeng, C. (in press). Downstream cross-holdings and upstream R&D: A comment. Journal of Industrial Economics,

According to Hu et al. [2022], downstream cross-holdings are permissible based on the social welfare standard if the investment technology in the upstream sector is highly inefficient. However, the conclusion of that paper relies on a definition of d... Read More about Downstream cross-holdings and upstream R&D: A comment.

Losses from horizontal merger and collusion (2024)
Journal Article
Beladi, H., & Mukherjee, A. (2024). Losses from horizontal merger and collusion. Journal of Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-024-00857-y

We show that the implications of a merger on collusion sustainability change significantly from the extant literature if merger is not profitable in the punishment subgame where firms play non-cooperative Cournot-Nash game. Merger either does not aff... Read More about Losses from horizontal merger and collusion.

Privatization and innovation in a vertical structure (2024)
Journal Article
Wu, X., Mukherjee, A., & Zeng, C. (2024). Privatization and innovation in a vertical structure. China Economic Review, 84, Article 102139. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2024.102139

We investigate how upstream privatization affects downstream R&D investments and social welfare in a vertically-related industry with an upstream monopolistic firm and two downstream firms. One of the downstream firms can undertake R&D investments to... Read More about Privatization and innovation in a vertical structure.

Licensing option to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier (2024)
Journal Article
Kao, K., & Mukherjee, A. (2024). Licensing option to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 26(1), Article e12682. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12682

It is well known that if the final goods producers adopt new technologies, the input suppliers with market power can extract more rent from the final goods producers by increasing the input prices. Higher rent extraction by the input supplier neither... Read More about Licensing option to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier.

Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal under non-commitment process innovation (2024)
Journal Article
Zhang, Q., Wang, L. F., & Mukherjee, A. (in press). Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal under non-commitment process innovation. Manchester School, https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12471

We provide a new reason for Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal. In a symmetric oligopoly, we show that firms get higher profits under Bertrand competition compared to Cournot competition under non-commitment process innovation if the products are suffi... Read More about Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal under non-commitment process innovation.

Welfare reducing licensing by an outside innovator (2024)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A., & Sinha, U. B. (2024). Welfare reducing licensing by an outside innovator. Economic Theory Bulletin, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00259-1

It is commonly believed that licensing of cost reducing technology increases welfare. We show that technology licensing by an outside innovator may reduce welfare when the technology is not useful for all final goods producers. Technology licensing r... Read More about Welfare reducing licensing by an outside innovator.

Strategic trade policy in a vertical structure with cross ownership (2023)
Book Chapter
Mukherjee, A., & Sinha, U. B. (in press). Strategic trade policy in a vertical structure with cross ownership. In S. Marjit, & B. Mandal (Eds.), International Trade, Resource Mobility and Adjustments in a Changing World: Essays in Memory of Ronald W. Jones. Springer

We consider an economy where the final goods producers use a key input supplied by a foreign monopolist. We show how different types of passive cross ownership affects export tax/subsidy policies in the final goods industry. In this respect, we show... Read More about Strategic trade policy in a vertical structure with cross ownership.

Lobbying for Tariff Protection, International Technology Licensing and Consumer Surplus (2023)
Journal Article
Liu, Y., & Mukherjee, A. (2023). Lobbying for Tariff Protection, International Technology Licensing and Consumer Surplus. B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 24(1), 117-139. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2022-0259

It is well known that the protectionist view for tariff protection can be justified if the tariff induced international technology licensing benefits the consumers. We show that this view may not hold true if the domestic firm lobbies for tariff prot... Read More about Lobbying for Tariff Protection, International Technology Licensing and Consumer Surplus.

Merger and product innovation under cross ownership and cooperative R&D (2023)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A. (2023). Merger and product innovation under cross ownership and cooperative R&D. Economics Letters, 233, Article 111418. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111418

We show that merger may increase investments in product innovation, and expected welfare if there is either passive cross ownership or cooperative research. Hence, the antitrust authorities may not need to be too concerned about mergers in these situ... Read More about Merger and product innovation under cross ownership and cooperative R&D.

Product Market Cooperation, Foreign Direct Investment and Consumer Welfare (2023)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A., & Sinha, U. B. (2024). Product Market Cooperation, Foreign Direct Investment and Consumer Welfare. Review of Industrial Organization, 64, 315-326. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-023-09925-x

Cooperation among rival firms raises serious skepticism among economists, policymakers, and legal experts, since it generally hurts consumers. We show that this may not be the case in an open economy with strategic foreign direct investment (FDI). Un... Read More about Product Market Cooperation, Foreign Direct Investment and Consumer Welfare.

Mergers of complements, endogenous product differentiation and welfare (2023)
Journal Article
Han, T., & Mukherjee, A. (2023). Mergers of complements, endogenous product differentiation and welfare. Mathematical Social Sciences, 126, 30-41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.09.001

The static analysis shows that a merger among complementary input suppliers or complementary patent holders benefits the consumers and the society by reducing the input prices. We show that the effects of a merger of complements are not so straightfo... Read More about Mergers of complements, endogenous product differentiation and welfare.

Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining and Innovation (2023)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A., & Saha, B. (in press). Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining and Innovation. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,

A firm undertakes workers’ productivity improving R&D before negotiating wage with the union, where negotiation can take place between their incentivised delegates. Under bilateral delegation profit, R&D and productivity-wage gap all increase, whilst... Read More about Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining and Innovation.

Cooperative R&D for a New Product under Convex Production Costs (2023)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A. (in press). Cooperative R&D for a New Product under Convex Production Costs. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,

The role of knowledge spillover for cooperative research and development (R&D), where firms commit before R&D about sharing R&D outcomes and choosing joint profit maximising R&D investments, is well known. In a duopoly model of product innovation wit... Read More about Cooperative R&D for a New Product under Convex Production Costs.

Low tariff on dirty goods—Environmental negligence or environmental concern? (2023)
Journal Article
Marjit, S., & Mukherjee, A. (2023). Low tariff on dirty goods—Environmental negligence or environmental concern?. Review of International Economics, 31(4), 1246-1270. https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12662

Shapiro (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2021) conducts an in-depth empirical analysis to show that dirtier upstream goods face lower import tariffs than cleaner downstream goods. Inspired by that paper, we examine how the welfare maximizing tariffs... Read More about Low tariff on dirty goods—Environmental negligence or environmental concern?.

Losses from cross-holdings in a duopoly with convex cost and strategic input price determination (2023)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A. (2023). Losses from cross-holdings in a duopoly with convex cost and strategic input price determination. Economic Theory Bulletin, 11, 81-91. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-022-00241-3

It is well-known that positive output externality on the outside firms is the reason for unprofitable passive cross-holding, which refers to a situation where a producer holds non-controlling shares in rival firms. Considering a final goods market wi... Read More about Losses from cross-holdings in a duopoly with convex cost and strategic input price determination.

The Connection between Imported Inputs and Exports: The Importance of Strategic Interdependence (2023)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A., & Liu, Y. (2023). The Connection between Imported Inputs and Exports: The Importance of Strategic Interdependence. Games, 14(1), Article 6. https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010006

Ignoring strategic interactions among final goods producers, the extant theoretical literature shows that lower costs of imported inputs increase the exports of the final goods using those inputs. Hence, it does not explain the empirically relevant p... Read More about The Connection between Imported Inputs and Exports: The Importance of Strategic Interdependence.

Pioneer, early follower or late entrant: Entry dynamics with learning and market competition (2023)
Journal Article
Chen, C. H., Mukherjee, A., & Ishida, J. (2023). Pioneer, early follower or late entrant: Entry dynamics with learning and market competition. European Economic Review, 152, Article 104360. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104360

Timing of market entry is one of the most important strategic decisions a firm must make, but its decision process becomes convoluted with information and payoff externalities. The threat of competition pushes firms to enter earlier to preempt their... Read More about Pioneer, early follower or late entrant: Entry dynamics with learning and market competition.