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All Outputs (281)

“… They don’t really listen to people”: Young people’s concerns and recommendations for improving online experiences (2019)
Journal Article
Creswick, H., Dowthwaite, L., Koene, A., Vallejos, E. P., Portillo, V., Cano, M., & Woodard, C. (2019). “… They don’t really listen to people”: Young people’s concerns and recommendations for improving online experiences. Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society, 17(2), 167-182. https://doi.org/10.1108/JICES-11-2018-0090

© 2019, Helen Creswick, Liz Dowthwaite, Ansgar Koene, Elvira Perez Vallejos, Virginia Portillo, Monica Cano and Christopher Woodard. Purpose: The voices of children and young people have been largely neglected in discussions of the extent to which th... Read More about “… They don’t really listen to people”: Young people’s concerns and recommendations for improving online experiences.

Subjective Theories of Well-Being (2019)
Book Chapter
Woodard, C. (2019). Subjective Theories of Well-Being. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics (1-8). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee927

Subjective theories of well-being seek to explain what makes something good for a subject in terms of that subject's psychological states. Two ways of distinguishing subjective and non-subjective theories are explained. The main issue dividing subjec... Read More about Subjective Theories of Well-Being.

Hybrid Theories of Well-Being (2019)
Book Chapter
Woodard, C. (2019). Hybrid Theories of Well-Being. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee894

Hybrid theories of well-being combine elements of two or more kinds of theory. The most familiar kinds of hybrid combine a subjective requirement (e.g. that a constituent of well-being is enjoyed or desired) with an objective requirement (e.g. that i... Read More about Hybrid Theories of Well-Being.

Four Dthats (2019)
Journal Article
Predelli, S. (2021). Four Dthats. Synthese, 198, 2959-2972. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02257-y

The distinction between a merely ‘rigidifying’ dthat and a directly-referential take on dthat-terms is well known, and is explicitly highlighted by Kaplan in Afterthoughts, his 1989 commentary on Demonstratives. What is not equally widely recognized... Read More about Four Dthats.

Against Incapacitative Punishment (2019)
Book Chapter
Hoskins, Z. (2019). Against Incapacitative Punishment. In J. W. de Keijser, J. V. Roberts, & J. Ryberg (Eds.), Predictive Sentencing: Normative and Empirical PerspectivesBloomsbury Publishing

Beyond Punishment? A Normative Account of the Collateral Legal Consequences of Conviction (2019)
Book
Hoskins, Z. (2019). Beyond Punishment? A Normative Account of the Collateral Legal Consequences of Conviction. Oxford University Press (OUP). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199389230.001.0001

People convicted of crimes are subject to a criminal sentence, but they also face a host of other restrictive legal measures: Some are denied access to jobs, housing, welfare, the vote, or other goods. Some may be deported, may be subjected to contin... Read More about Beyond Punishment? A Normative Account of the Collateral Legal Consequences of Conviction.

Fine-grained and Coarse-grained Knowledge in Euthydemus 293b7–d1 (2019)
Journal Article
Duncombe, M. (2019). Fine-grained and Coarse-grained Knowledge in Euthydemus 293b7–d1. Australasian Philosophical Review, 3(2), 198-205. https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2020.1716666

McCabe [2021: 137–40] identifies a crucial ambiguity in the terms ‘learns’ and ‘knows’. Such terms can be read as either ‘perfective’ or ‘imperfective’. This is an aspect difference. The former indicates a settled state, the latter a directed process... Read More about Fine-grained and Coarse-grained Knowledge in Euthydemus 293b7–d1.

Race and the Responsibility to Abide by the Norms of Unchosen and Unjust Social Roles (2019)
Journal Article
Kisolo-Ssonko, J. (2019). Race and the Responsibility to Abide by the Norms of Unchosen and Unjust Social Roles. Monist, 102(2), 172-186. https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onz004

© The Author(s), 2019. Charles Mills claims that there are specific "civic and political duties" which individuals have a responsibility to fulfil because of the racial social roles they occupy. However, even those generally sympathetic to Role Ethic... Read More about Race and the Responsibility to Abide by the Norms of Unchosen and Unjust Social Roles.

Personal Identity (2019)
Book
Noonan, H. (2019). Personal Identity. (3rd). New York: Taylor & Francis (Routledge). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315107240

Who am I? What is a person? What does it take for a person to persist from one time to another? What is the relation between the mind and the body? These are just some of the questions that constitute the problem of personal identity, one of the olde... Read More about Personal Identity.

What's the point of knowledge?: a function-first epistemology (2019)
Book
Hannon, M. (2019). What's the point of knowledge?: a function-first epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press (OUP). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190914721.001.0001

This book is about knowledge and its value. At its heart is a straightforward idea: we can answer many interesting and difficult questions in epistemology by reflecting on the role of epistemic evaluation in human life. Michael Hannon calls this appr... Read More about What's the point of knowledge?: a function-first epistemology.

It Takes More than Moore to Answer Existence-Questions (2019)
Journal Article
Egerton, K. (2021). It Takes More than Moore to Answer Existence-Questions. Erkenntnis, 86(2), 355-366. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00107-4

Several recent discussions of metaphysics disavow existence-questions, claiming that they are metaphysically uninteresting because trivially settled in the affirmative by Moorean facts. This is often given as a reason to focus metaphysical debate ins... Read More about It Takes More than Moore to Answer Existence-Questions.

You can trust the ladder, but you shouldn’t (2019)
Journal Article
Tallant, J. (2019). You can trust the ladder, but you shouldn’t. Theoria, 85(2), 102-118. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12177

My claim in this paper is that, contra what I take to be the orthodoxy in the wider literature, we do trust inanimate objects—per the example in the title, there are cases where people really do trust a ladder (to hold their weight, for instance), an... Read More about You can trust the ladder, but you shouldn’t.